

Ukrainian Nationalism, Socialism and the Resistance to Imperialism in the 20th Century: From Franko to Stoyan

Matthew Raphael Johnson
Johnstown, PA

Introduction

In no way can a brief article do any justice to a complex idea like the Ukrainian nation. While this author has dedicated his academic life to these and related topics, its poor treatment in the press and distortion by certain emigre circles calls for a certain clarification. One that will not doubt please no one. However, this article purports to be nothing but a scattered set of ideas on a colossal topic penetrated by only a few.

National movements develop a scheme of history. Historical schools in the last two centuries have differed on what form of organization is the prime mover in history: national, urban, or civilizational, or economic. National histories have chosen among them to construct the best narrative. Of course, all histories do this, as the pure “abstract theorist” of fantasy does not exist anywhere.

The specific Ukrainian idea historically is worthwhile. It begins at Kievan Rus (really before that, with a Slavic civilization going far back in time) and does not veer off into Suzdal or Moscow. Rather, the powerful, but short-lived, state of Galicia was far superior as an example. Perfectly situated on Central European trading routes and blessed with endless salt marshes, the constant and usually violent confrontations between noble and crown led to a fairly balanced system. Two monarchs in particular, Roman and Daniel, ruling during the high middle ages, brought Galicia to the height of its power.

Suzdal was seen as a foreign state of Finns and northern tribes including Lapps and Permians which sacked Kiev under the prince of Vladimir, Andrei, in 1169. Andrei, nicknamed “Bogolyubsky,” was half Cuman¹ though his mother. Instead, the Ukrainian idea is slowly absorbed into Lithuania, which had called itself the gatherer of Rus' before Moscow did. Tver had called itself the Third Rome before Moscow, and some have argued that Novgorod, Suzdal and even Ohrida claimed that title.

From the fall of the Galician state under the Mongols to the concomitant growth of Rus-Lithuania, gradual Polonization led to the creation of the Uniat, or “Greek Catholic” church, a symbol of colonial rule that attracted the ire of the Cossacks. The Cossack host is normally seen in the early modern era as having two sides: the first, the Hetmanate, or those groups fighting Polish or Turkish forces in that part of Ukraine and the Sich (or fortress) Cossacks at Zaporozhya. The latter had a tendency to be very populist, while the former was split between pro-Russian and pro-Polish wings (see below).

1 The Cuman or Polovtsy were a Turkic tribe and a long-time enemy of the Slavs.

The broader point is that the idea of Kievan Rus and that of Moscow have little in common. The Ukrainian view, of both Orthodox and Uniat backgrounds, is that Kiev is best represented by the royal state of Galicia under Roman and Daniel, and then the decentralized Russian state of Lithuania, where the overwhelming majority of its population was Russian and Orthodox. Only after the Treaty of Lublin (1569) did Poland slowly absorb the Lithuanian elements as the Russian nobility fled to Moscow's territory.

For historians such as Mykola Kostamarov in the 19th century to Mikhail Hrushevsky and Petro Doroshenko in the 20th, that approach has been dominant. The argument is that there is no quick transfer of the crown from Kiev to Suzdal to Moscow. That scheme of history, formalized in the 19th century by Katkov and even earlier by Karamazin, is still worthwhile and contains some truth, but it suffers by refusing to take Russian-Lithuania into account. Only in understanding, however vaguely, that scheme of history does the Ukrainian nationalist movement make any sense.

Two Ukraines, Two Hetmans:

Pavel Teterya and Pavel Skoropadsky

Two figures, distant from one another in time although bearing the same title, serve to show the problematic aspects of Ukrainian nationalism and the eternal question of Ukraine's orientation. Pavel Teterya, Cossack Hetman (monarch, war leader) of Polish Ukraine (that is, the Right Bank) died circa 1670. He was condemned by many, possibly a majority of Ukrainians at the time, for a pro-Polish outlook based on a strongly aristocratic political orientation. The Ukrainian idea for him was western, European and can become a part of a federated structure with other ethnic groups including Poland. Ukraine was for Teterya and many like him, an integral part of Central, not Eastern Europe.

Another Hetman, Pavel Skoropadsky,² came to power just as Germany was signing the Versailles treaty. He is condemned equally with Teterya, but due to a pro-Russian, rather than a pro-western, stance. Neither man can be considered anti-Ukrainian in the least, but the means to ensure independence and cultural flourishing were very different. Both realized that Ukraine was too exposed to both east and west to ever be "independent."

Teterya believed in a strong Ukrainian, Cossack nobility modeled on the Confederations within the Polish Senate. Seeking a cohesive elite, the preservation of noble and church property were essential for the maintenance of some kind of autonomy. Since a totally free independence was out of the question in the 1660s, Teterya sought a confederation of equality with Poland and Lithuania based on the Treaty of Hadiach (1658), negotiated by his predecessor, Ivan Vyhovsky.

This treaty, never made into law, described a political vision with Ukraine in a confederate union with Poland and Lithuania on the following conditions: that Orthodoxy and Catholicism be legally equal, that Polish and Jewish colonists be expelled, that Cossack nobles have the same rights as Polish ones, and that the Hetman be an office of strength, one that can quickly react to any violation of the agreement. This was accepted by Poland and the pro-western faction of Cossacks. The Russian invasion and the consequent Treaty of Andrusovo (1667) put an

2 Sometimes, modern Ukrainian spells his name Skoropadskyi (Скоропадський). Of course, Pavel is the Slavic for "Paul." The name is of ancient Ukrainian-Lithuanian background. He was related to the earlier Hetman of Ukraine Ivan I Skoropadsky (d. 1722) through Ivan's daughter, who married Petro Tolstoy, producing another Ivan, from which Pavel is his grandson. This means Pavel is the great-great-grandson of Ivan I and hence, has at least a hereditary claim to the Hetmanate, something desired by the famous revolutionary Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and many others.

end to that, as this Treaty divided Ukraine into Polish and Russian halves.

Russian agents spread the word that Teterya's consultation with the Poles means that he wanted the Polish oligarchical system of "government" to be imposed on all Ukraine. They spread rumors that he had converted to Catholicism, which at the time was the same as to cease being Ukrainian. Most of his career was spent fending off rebellion and invasion from all sides, and he died a broken, miserable man. Even the date of his death is uncertain.

The Reds having briefly taken most of Ukraine by 1918, were overthrown by Pavel Skoropadsky (died 1945) who then ruled Ukraine as Hetman for a short time after World War I. German forces, brought into Ukraine due to Lenin's signing of Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918), approved the coup and offered limited support to the Hetman. The problem was that neither Bolsheviks nor the "western" camp in Ukraine were satisfied.

In war torn Ukraine, suffering from total dislocation, chaos, warfare and death, Skoropadsky put Ukraine on a solid, independent footing. A former officer in the tsarist army, he mixed the best of Russian, German and Ukrainian traditions in government. Every Ukrainian family under the Hetman was guaranteed 25 acres as a minimum which was inalienable. This land cannot be taken away as debt repayment.

He created a peasant land bank that permitted peasants to buy land at subsidized rates. He created a firm monetary regime that was accepted throughout the nation for the first time. He massively increased education at all levels and created a brand new police force for the collection of taxes. Given the chaos of the age, the state under the previous Rada (that is, Council or parliament) failed to project power outside of Kiev. Skoropadsky realized that, in order for the country to survive, he needed a strong state, a rational army on the Russian model, and a navy. He succeeded on all counts.

His policies were so successful that he was able to loan the White army of General Denikin 10 million rubles and, at the same time, finance the newly independent state of Georgia. Ukraine was totally self-sufficient in food, and exported a full 35% of the total harvest in 1918. The most impressive achievement of all is that the Hetman did this only between April and December of 1918. Such clear political genius created for him numerous enemies.

Ukrainian "nationalists," in league with both Poland and Lenin, overthrew Skoropadsky near the end of 1918, forcing him to flee to Germany. Ukraine was then governed by the ineffectual Directory, modeled after the French Revolutionary council of the same name, making the country ripe for the Red takeover. Since Symon Petliura (died 1926), the head of this "nationalist" government, refused to fight with the White forces, he went to Poland for military assistance. This absurd alliance was rejected by nearly all, since Poland had made it clear that it sought to annex much of Ukraine to itself. However, for a brief time, Poland and Petliura had defeated both Whites and Reds.³

Petliura was a member of the "Poltava" Masonic organization, as were several of the major Ukrainian nationalists in the 19th and early 20th century. This was also the organization that initially gave birth to the elite Decembrist movement. It is not, however, to conclude from this that Petliura was in any way "illuminated" but that he was a member and recruited within its ranks.

Petliura, a Mason and ostensible Ukrainian nationalist, cooperated with the Poles against the Reds, and cooperated with the Reds against Skoropadsky, a policy almost designed to destroy the strong foundation for independence Skoropadsky had skillfully laid. These "nationalists"

3 This is sometimes called the Polish-Soviet War and lasted from 1919 to 1921. See Davies, Norman Richard (1972). *White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20*. Random House

ensured the genocide of Ukraine that both the Poles and Reds would unleash.

The Directory was split between Petliura's "republican" faction and V. Vinnychenko's "communist" faction. Like Stepan Bandera (see below) Petliura was a "social nationalist," believing in a "labor Ukraine" that is governed by both workers and peasants. The real problem was poverty: Petliura held that the present, war torn condition of Ukraine was a breeding ground for opportunism. This means that the poor, the war-weary and the exhausted will accept any government promising some level of stability. That was not the role either the Rada or Directory was able to play. Only two factions were capable of this: Skoropadsky or the Bolsheviks.

The narrative above summarizes much about Ukrainian life. The Teterya movement was western, aristocratic, and pro-Polish. Other major figures promoting this view were Hetmans Ivan Vyhovsky and Ivan Mazepa. This is the proverbial "western" approach of Ukrainian nationalists. Petliura was clearly in this camp as well, as were most Ukrainian Masons.

The other faction is represented by Gogol or Skoropadsky. Hetmans such as Damian Mnohohrishny (d. 1703) or Ivan Briukhovetsky (d.1688) were pro-Russian, but did not accept any form of direct rule from Moscow. Neither faction wanted anything other than an autonomous or (later) independent Ukraine, but the question was the source of identity and the means of its achievement.

Ivan Franko

The era of Skoropadsky came on the heels of Ivan Franko's death in 1916. Franko was one of the more interesting figures in the Ukrainian national-socialist movement in the early 20th century. Constantly reassessing the nature of the state, Franko made arguments for a national form of state socialism while, in other contexts, direct condemnations of the state in general. The state, at its worst, is an unfairly privileged institution which enshrines political and economic inequality as the "common good."

He accepted Marxism on four specific points: that dialectics, rather than linear logic, is the best way to understand the social nature of logic. The dialectical method, almost always misunderstood and mangled, is the constant interplay of the ideal and its physical manifestation. In other words, any ideal of the nation is constantly being contrasted to the daily grind of social or civic life. Movement is then the perception of the gap between the two.

Secondly, he accepted Marx's concept of surplus value. There are two ways to view this: the first is that the act of production has to produce more value that it took to make the product. The surplus value is then what is absolutely required in order to a) replace and maintain capital and b) provide a profit for the capitalist. The profit for the owner of capital is the second element of surplus value. The two both require surplus value, but their social distinctions are very clear. The productivity of labor and its manifestation in wages is another example of how dialectical logic is superior to its Anglo-American linear and bourgeois competitor. Its significance is that, given the massive increases in productivity then and now, man need only work a few hours a week to ensure all basic needs are met.

Third, that history can be understood as being set in motion by changes in the means of production. As those profiting from capital continually use labor to better increase production in both quality and quantity, technology changes. History is then this dialectical adjustment among labor, technology and the classes that benefit from both. Finally, he accepted the idea of labor as the sole source of value, something uniting both Locke and Marx.

He rejected Marx on the questions of materialism, the domination of the state and, finally,

the fact that centralization of capital has not occurred. Small business has not been destroyed in the west the way Marx had predicted. Franko held that civilization can never be reduced to matter in motion. Thought, social exchange, symbolism, ideals and hopes for the future are not produced by material things. These goods are in fact, not material at all.⁴

Marx was useful, but since he rejected the importance of ethnic ties, he was ultimately rejected. The broader point is that any true nationalism, being based on solidarity, cannot then enshrine competition in economics. For Franko, capitalism was based on three things: the demand of capital for labor at the lowest possible price, to buy raw materials and other necessities at the lowest possible price and finally, to sell the product to the public at the highest possible price.

The modern state, however, is different from government. It is not based on solidarity, but comes into existence through force. This force is that of the wealthier elements of the population using their private security as “government.” The modern state is a machine that cannot command loyalty. The ethnic group, the folk certainly can, but the relations between the folk and the state are normally in opposition.⁵ Later in his career, Franko would reject anarchism because the human race had been too brutalized by the machine. Self-government and the capitalist division of labor were not only incommensurable, but polar opposites.

Franko's view was that independence is a necessity for both solidarity and economic reform. Colonialism was a problem in part because it automatically condemned the profits from labor in the country to be shipped out of it. Colonization made no sense unless the colonizer was getting something out of it. For Franko, the colonization of the poorer by the richer was justified by progress and social Darwinism. The only thing now included in this concept of progress was moral progress.

Franko's view of history was progressive, but a progress based on moral liberty. Economic development is one thing, but if it does not lead to the emancipation from labor (or at least drudgery), then it is not worthwhile. Progress itself is ambiguous as it has opposing effects on specific human peoples and places. The division of labor, which is main driving force of development, together with the disparity of strength, character and abilities creates and exacerbates inequality among people. Like most nationalists, Franko argues that national belonging must be based on some sort of substantial equality. Nothing can justify the rule of a small handful of rich people and millions of the exploited poor.

Franko's understanding of history is the growth process of human free activities to expand the limits of the possible. However, man is not abstract: this liberation from necessity and drudgery is also mostly at the level of families and communities, not individuals.

It is essential that defining community through which people able to exercise their pursuit of happiness, Ivan Franko emphasizes the nation as an integral organic and natural part of the historical process. Franko could not be clearer in his book, *Beyond the Limits of the Possible*:

Anything that goes beyond the frame of the nation is either hypocrisy from people of internationalized ideals which serve to provide cover for ethnic domination of one nation over another. Either that, or a sickly sentimentalism

4 Франко, Іван. Соціалізм і соціал-демократизм. Originally published in «Житє і слово» in 1897 (Volume 6, number 4, pps 265-292). This article was banned in Soviet Ukraine.

5 Франко, Іван. Формальний і реальний націоналізм. This article was not published until 1936 abroad. The essential argument is that nationalism requires socialism.

and fiction that could only serve to express one's alienation from his own people.⁶

The left is failing, so Franko argued, because it has nothing but economic demands to hold society together. This is completely insufficient. The nation is “a natural expression of the soul.” In this sense, the nation is an essential part of one's individual makeup. Without it, mass society develops: a gaggle of undifferentiated, mostly superfluous “voters” and “consumers.” Each person is responsible for changing himself away from the mass, it's just that the mass is much easier: there is no freedom or identity to live up to. The nation is as much subjective as objective. He rejected anything that turned man into a machine, which is what he saw modernity doing.

The “savage” is the moral superior of the “Enlightened” English colonialist, since the Enlightenment itself came from England's exploitation of much of the world. Progress is hence dependent on colonialism, the factory system and the ideology of materialism that turns man into a machine. The problem with Darwin was that freedom is nowhere to be found. The world is a mechanized unit. Therefore, in the human world, there must be something that does not evolve, namely our consciousness and freedom. Franko's atheism (which waxed and waned throughout his career) was not compatible with the mechanism of Darwin's theory. For him, the dialectic of freedom and necessity in nature always tormented his work and never found a solution.

Even worse, Franko found no home on either the “right” or the “left” in Ukraine's complex politics of the early 20th century. As Petliura and Vinnychenko never resolved their differences, Franko's loathing of the left was based on the fact that they rejected the nation. What sort of society could be based merely on economic self-interest? After all, that's all socialism was claiming. Without the “national,” the “socialist” is vapid, empty economism.

Since Franko was a socialist and atheist, the Orthodox or ethnic “right” had no interest in him. Since he believed in ethnic solidarity and moral regeneration, the “left” offered nothing to him either. As a secular man, Franko remains in the minority among Ukrainian nationalists, but his poetry and prose electrified activists regardless.

Stepan Bandera and the OUN

Famous Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera (died 1959) argued that the nation is a genetic unity. It is based on shared biological foundations because it is based on intermarriage and hence, genetic similarity. People normally do not marry those who do not speak their language, which in the present climate in America, is a controversial statement. This difference in genetic constitution implies that economics and life choices will differ among peoples in that they are – at their most rooted biological level – different from one another. As genetics interact with the topography and political history of a people, a real, distinct ethnos is formed.

For Bandera, the family is the first community and the primal one. This slowly develops into a sense of mutual interdependence, one founded on a sense of solidarity that becomes the root of nationhood. This is especially pronounced if the group is undergoing external pressure from a marauding foe or a rapacious empire. This solidarity is, importantly, the root of a basic egalitarianism in economic life. Labor, as Hegel argued, is national in the sense that the division of labor is the transformation of individual interest into the collective.

6 Ivan Franko, ‘Beyond the Limits of the Possible’, from Ralph Lindheim and George S.N. Luckyj, eds., *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine* (Toronto 1996)

A common goal requires working in a climate of sacrifice and virtue. Like Ivan Franko and many others, nationalism for Bandera is a cultural unity leading to solidarity. In turn, this sense of family belonging alters the nature of work and hence, economic life. In many respects, this is an excellent ethical understanding of the folk-ethnos.

The state is essential here due to the size, power and militancy of the myriad enemies Ukraine faced in the first half of the 20th century. The state protects the ethnos and guarantees independence both economic and political. The state, as the instrument of the ethnos, guides investment and focuses resources on that which Ukraine can produce well. The point at which the state develops interests of its own, which might come close to adding some actual content to the “civic nation.” This, in truth, is just a mystification of state power without an ethnic or moral focus other than its own survival.⁷

Some object to Bandera's insistence on ideological uniformity, seemingly innocent of the extreme levels of genocide the country had suffered. Apart from being a common and universal goal of all those with political power, Bandera sought a unified Ukraine as a means of self-defense and economic development. It was either that sort of militancy or national destruction. As of 2014, it is the latter, showing the fate of all “civic nations.”

Bandera accepted a limited state (since ethnic states are limited by definition), but one strong enough to maintain independence under the worst of conditions. While the concept irritates western minds that generally have no identity at all, the Ukrainian context fully justifies his combativeness.⁸ For him, the state was a moral unity that, at its best, protects and facilitates both the material and spiritual life of the people (as opposed to a party).

The reality is that Bandera argued for a simple platform that sought primarily to fight the USSR, and only later to build a strongly integralist state that is capable of maintaining what would be a highly fragile independence. He rejected the idea that political factions, even together, represent “the people.” The nation is a unity while its negation is the party or faction which invariably represents some frustrated faction of an elite seeking power. Imperialism is when an ethnos decides to take other territories outside of itself. Mutual respect can only exist when each group remains on its traditional territory.

The nation generates its own ideological and philosophical forms. It does this by synthesizing historical experience and the cultural defense mechanisms that have been erected to deal with war, colonial occupation, genocide and poverty, all of which Ukraine has had more than its share. These are precious expressions of the human desire for freedom (though not egotistical self-assertion) and are crucial towards creating a strong foundation upon which an integral foundation can be erected.

In this sense, the nation is organic in that it is a natural outgrowth of the family and genetic principle, as well as the division of labor and the need for human beings to cooperate. Cooperation cannot occur without the nation. The role of the political or philosophical leader is to synthesize all of these into a program that is wide enough to contain many different tendencies, but narrow enough to be a source for policy.⁹ Bandera argued that the moral norm is universalism, but such a view can only be expressed through the many nations that each form an aspect of it. There is no universal truth without particular truths.

7 Посівнич, Микола. Степан Бандера — життя, присвячене свободі. Літопис УПА, 2008, III (N. Posivnych, from the Collected Works of the UPA, vol 3).

8 Ibid.

9 Кук, Василь. Життя і діяльність Степана Бандери: документи й матеріали / Редактор і упорядник — Микола Посівнич. Тернопіль: Астон, 2008 (Vasyl Kuk)

Vasyl Stus and the Nature of the Motherland

Ukrainian anti-Soviet dissident Vasyl Stus (died 1985) made the claim that only in suffering is the self ever really known. Each man, in Stus' view, creates a “shell,” a sort of protective coating that protects him from the world of the spirit. This is a defensive mechanism to avoid all that which cannot be quantified. The spirit cannot be mechanized, it cannot be reduced to slogans or ideological manifestos. Therefore, it is avoided.

On occasion, this shell is broken when suffering is imposed upon it. The practical life of the external world is exposed as disguised contempt and the self discovers it has no anchor. Suffering forces the person to become fully known, to live entirely according to internal, ideal principles rather than external results.

The world has gone mad, therefore, we are forced to turn inward. The problem is that, for many, if not most, there is nothing to turn to. There is no inner self, but rather a superficial set of masks that are changed as circumstances dictate. Here, avoiding suffering seems to be the only purpose. It comes at the expense of personhood. This is the “mass man,” one incapable of rising above the pleasure-pain nexus. They are already dead.

Looking around, Stus came to realize that “success” was identical with both mediocrity and amorality. In the Soviet Union, the most absurd policies and ideas needed to be defended and justified. The problem was the long lines of volunteers to do just that. When pain becomes that which should be avoided at all costs, amorality is the necessary consequence. He watched professional frauds loudly trumpeted by the Soviet press solely because they supported the KGB's agenda. Talentless hacks were being called “geniuses” while the truly gifted were dying in frozen Gulag cells. Certain things do not change.

Stus is significant because he connected the symbols of home, mother, nation (motherland), nature and freedom as essentially one thing. If JP Sartre was to “solve” the existential issue in Marxism (or his own version of socialism) then Stus, who actually lived under it, created his own “solution” – our home, our motherland. The earth sustains man in that our ancestors are buried in it while we eat what grows out of it. The soil of one's motherland literally becomes part of our body.

Freedom cannot exist without our home. There is no abstract man, nor is there abstract freedom: it is always a service to something. For Stus, fighting the USSR was the only service he knew. In 1965, a movie was shown in Kiev, one by Sergei Paradzhanov, *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*.¹⁰ This led to a protest against the recent spate of arrests against dissidents and Ukrainian nationalists currently taking place. Stus was one of a handful that spoke out after the screening, knowing full well what will happen to him as a result. Once he publicly denounced the KGB's tyranny, he was removed from the university where he was pursuing its graduate studies for “systematic violations of the norms of behavior of graduate students and staff members of research institutions” (from Kostash, 1998).

The Ukrainian dissident movement during the Cold War was normally an aspect of the nationalist movement. The Ukrainian ethnos, of course, was defined in many different ways, but there was a radical disjuncture between an artificial ideology such as Marxism on the one hand,

¹⁰ This film was released in the US in 1967. Not only did Stus get arrested due to his support of this film and its director, but the producer himself, Paradzhanov, was sentenced to five years hard labor as a result of his work. Technically, the film was condemned due to its purely realistic and romantic approach to the Hutsul people (a Slavic tribe in the Carpathians), but it shows an ethnic group in the full flower of its customs. This was why it needed to go.

and the organic development of custom and language, on the other. The latter is fluid, having stood the test of time. The former is rigid and doctrinaire, leading of course, to the existence of the dissident.

The fact that the Gulag loudspeakers during Stus' time there were proudly announcing the signing of the Helsinki Accords on human rights was a vivid reminder of the nature of ideology. That the Soviet Union was so insane as to beam this into a Gulag population shows just how inverted and carnivalesque things had become. The world was mad, so the only thing that a man deprived of his home could do is go inside. To enter one's inner world is the last line of defense against insanity.

Dmytro Pavlychko

One useful but largely ignored approach to nationalism comes from the work of Dmytro Pavlychko (b. 1929). His "The Ukrainian National Idea" (2002) defines nationalism simply as the single highest form of meaningful social integration. Nationalism must be ethnic, since that is the source of culture. In addition, the struggles of a people are fundamental aspects of the folk and its subjective sense of unity. It is, as Bandera also suggests, forms of self-defense that have become ritualized as aspects of social behavior. This is the sign of a healthy society in the same sense that a strong immune system is a sign of a healthy body.

In his lecture of 2002 at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, Pavlychko defined nationalism this way:

It is difficult to ascertain what the national idea refers to generally, because it can be understood as a complex unity containing ones mother tongue, customs, rituals, etc. . . . It is the language of each people that serves as the foundation for identity, as well as its cultural and spiritual tradition. It also contains historical memory, its general mentality, its economic development, topography and general folkways. The national idea combines the essential identity of a people and the requirements for their autonomous and free development, none of which are independent of the state.¹¹

The last sentence is crucial. It is the summary of his thought in general. Nationalism is the synthesis of two distinct sets of ideas, that of the ethnic identity and purpose as well as how these are protected and nurtured. The state, in traditionally German and Slavic sense, is both the nature of this unity and the form of its protection. The "state" is both the constitution of the state, that is, its traditional sense of justice, and the more formal institutions of coercion.

Historical facts have forged a unity in the face of constant pressure, violence and the very real possibility of destruction. Language too is born from the violence of history. No people on the globe have been free of foreign occupation or devastating warfare. It is these periods where one's "otherness" is made quite clear, and thus, is the source of ethnic identity.

Each ethnos will create structures appropriate to itself, since conditions vary so radically. Law and state structures emanate from custom and history. Importantly, as soon as this connection between law and the ethnos is severed, the state loses its legitimacy. In saying that "none [of these things] are independent of the state," he is speaking from a typically Ukrainian point of view. While national-anarchism was very common in 19th century Ukraine, its precarious

¹¹ Pavlychko, D. The Ukrainian National Idea. Inaugural Lecture honorary doctorate of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2002 (translation mine).

geographic position and its tough neighborhood make statelessness impossible. The state must exist for both Pavlychko and Bandera because all the custom and history in the world will not save the people from Stalin, or worse, western capitalism.

Suffering reveals the truth that happiness is not in possessions, urban “sophistication” or the bureaucratic pecking order. It is to be found in simplicity, something that has long been a part of Ukrainian ethnic thought since at least Kulish. This is what the enemies of nationalism fail to grasp: that ethnicity is born in the fires of pain and suffering. It is a function of what this writer has called elsewhere the “structures of resistance.”

The more evil the ruling system becomes, the more isolated the ethnos. The contradiction between the outer, disordered regime and the internal memory of the folk become extreme. What this can do is re-orient priorities, force people to find happiness in simplicity, and spiritualize daily life. Post-communist Ukraine, he states, works from the foundation only of money and power, the only “universal values” in the present global order.

Pavlychko's idea is that the Ukrainian sense of self had existed as a medieval construct. Just as the Anglo-Norman shaped the subjectivity of the Gaels, the unia and Polish occupation shaped the Ukrainian idea. The Cossacks and Brotherhoods were the mainstays of the Orthodox Church under the violent thumb of the Polish nobility, and hence, these institutions are manifestations of ideas that became a part of the Ukrainian sense of self. Suffering can be cleansing and generate an awareness of reality rather than the image.

The academic hacks who condemn nationalism as “mythical” have no difficulty accepting abstract concepts such as the individual, the “global community,” or “international civilization” as perfectly real and obvious. This absurdity shows that the academic elite are tied to capital, since this is their creation. For Pavlychko, there is no such thing as an “international morality” and certainly no planetary “civilization.”

National belonging is a prerequisite for a solid doctrine of rights. Since rights do not hang in midair, they must have an origin that is not entirely reducible to mere expressions of utility or self-interest. Cosmopolitanism can generate no doctrine of rights, since it has no substantive qualities at all. The abstract “individual” or “universal values” can generate nothing concrete, since those slogans are themselves vapid and vacuous.

The distinction between truth and the world of media-generated images is what suffering can make clear. Foreign occupation and constant war forces the more civic minded of the ethnos to be isolated and impoverished. Only from this vantage point can the system be seen for what it truly is. The bureaucratic mentality is one that will serve anyone with power. Hence, these functionaries, since they benefit from the system, cannot judge it. Those who they exclude in the name of “tolerance” and “openness” see them as the frauds they are, but it is only through such exclusion can the truth be fully understood.

Darius Stoyan and Donstov's School

In the work of Darius Stoyan, a young graduate student at Taras Shevchenko University (as of 2013), the main concern is to justify the primordial origins of the folk. He writes that the nation derives from the Latin word for “tribe.” The tribe, not self-sufficient, slowly develops into a larger confederation of similar peoples until a nation is formed. Stoyan agrees with the conception that this development is hastened by the existence of a violent enemy or foreign occupation. People suffering this way are automatically excluded as a group and hence, their resistance becomes identical with the nation.

Put differently, ethnicity has always existed, as the ancient annals of Scotland, Ireland and Greece testify. However, it was not necessarily politicized, nor part of the subjective mentality of the common folk.¹² It was merely there, a unity within which social interaction can be mutually comprehensible. The growth of the modern state and the arrogance of bureaucratic empires created the politicized version of ethnicity known as “nationalism.”

Nationalism for Stoyan is comprised of the people, living in a specific territory, forging bonds and affective ties through the constant struggle with neighbors, powerful empires and nature herself. A spiritual essence is formed that becomes the center of the ethnic consciousness and marks them off from others close by. Religion, language and economic forms further differentiate the peoples. Intermarriage becomes inevitable since families must have significant commonalities to function, similar to nations.¹³ He writes,

The national concept is manifest in the supreme principle of unity and actualized through the human will determined to create unity from the raw material of the ethnic experience. It has its own values developed by the creative interaction of people living in the same area speaking the same language.¹⁴

Following the work of D. Dontsov, the stress here is on the common will of the leadership in forging a nation. As mentioned above, however, the severe circumstances of Ukraine throughout the entirety of the 20th century – and even more so today – makes such militancy justifiable. The “raw material” (which is my translation) is the historical folk-ethnicity of the population, often taken for granted or seen as so normal that it does not require comment. A militant leadership comes into existence, as Bandera shows, at times when the very existence of the nation is at stake. Militant organization, the forcible creation of unity in the face of extermination, is the issue here. In 2014, the same conditions apply.

Nations have existed as ethno-linguistic units throughout history, as has the imperial desire to destroy such identity. Empires are defined as those entities that unify nations in the interests of the ruling group. Empires are not nations themselves, but federations answering to a common center. The point is that there is no empire without nations, and they come to define each other. There is no civic life without linguistic and cultural unities.¹⁵

Since a non-alienated mankind seeks solidarity, justice, protection and communal belonging (which are all tightly related), nations are a natural and normal social form. Empires, however, are the products of greed and alienation. Solidarity creates the standards for progress, success and organization that abstract theory cannot hope to provide.

Nationalism became the weapon of choice against the economic aggression of the industrial world. Industrialization is inherently international since imperial empires existed

12 The concept of “subjective awareness” is a red herring. Ideology is always the domain of intellectuals and activists. Most of the common folk take their unities for granted, since much else occupies their time. Using this as an argument that nationalism is a recent phenomenon is just poor reasoning.

13 Stoyan, D. (2012a) Шевченка в історіософській концепції Ю. І. Вассіяна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center.

14 Stoyan, D. (2012) Проблема визначення поняття «нація» в контексті філософської спадщини Ю.Вассіяна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center (translation mine)

15 See two articles of his: Stoyan, D. (2012) Проблема визначення поняття «нація» в контексті філософської спадщини Ю.Вассіяна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center; and Stoyan, D. (2012a) Шевченка в історіософській концепції Ю. І. Вассіяна. Publications of the Dmytro Dontsov Research Center.

before either capitalism or industrialism. Europe after World War II became an economic, rather than a cultural entity. The Bretton Woods system demanded the rejection of nationalism and mercantilism as a condition for access to credit. The post-war order was, in part, based on the implication that only the economy has rights over the population.

In Stoyan's analysis of nationalism, he summarizes the concept in several ways. It is a subjective principle of identity, but its objective elements are equally significant. Culture is really the manifestation of a historical unity. Culture, in other words, is a product of history acting within the variables such as geography or available resources.

Theoretical Views on Ukrainian Nationalism, Socialism and Capitalism since the Dissolution of the USSR

Matthew Raphael Johnson

The disturbing events in the first two months of 2014 show the severity of the Ukrainian issue and its significance for the west. To argue that the violent and unopposed protests were arranged and protected by US intelligence is to argue the obvious: no one risks their life for abstract issues such as EU membership.

Major media have far more freedom in describing an obscure culture like the Ukrainian. Journalists, editors and advertisers do not know the first thing about Ukrainian history, and yet these people are in charge of disseminating useful information to the public without the tools to discriminate. Few deny that the western-imposed “capitalist shock” of the early 1990s was a total disaster, outstripping even the German invasion of 1940 in terms of economic destruction. That suddenly, this awareness no longer functions is to stretch credulity. Regardless of the poll consulted or its language, pro-western opinions in Ukraine rarely get over 5%. The west is associated, even in Lv'iv with amoral politics, irrational economics and naked oligarchy claims to be both universal and democratic.

Whether Russian nationalist or Ukrainian Banderite, nationalist have no illusion concerning the nature of the west. To the extent that the west is atomized, alienated and a laboratory of psychological pathologies, Ukrainian “nationalists” reject it. Therefore, it is not a stretch to argue that the “OUN” protesters in Kiev were hired and bussed in from elsewhere. It is laughable to argue that such a group would jettison their entire agenda to lose their independence in a bankrupt and imperial European Union. However, since the chances of any editor being so questioned is slim, they can print what suits them.

The relations between Ukraine and Russia, specifically in the economic sphere, have been largely strained since Ukraine declared independence from the USSR in 1992. Major issues such as the status of the Black Sea Fleet, Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas, Russian speakers in Ukraine, the USSR's human rights record, and relations with western powers such as the EU or NATO are just a few of the most significant issues. This paper will seek to analyze the problems these two states face within the context of the major international relations approaches of realism/statism, Dependency (as a cognate of critical theory), Constructivism and postmodernism. All of these approaches have important insights into this critical area of global conflict.

However, the single event is the 1991-1995 meltdown. Hitler's invasion of the USSR destroyed roughly 40% of the Russo-Ukrainian economy. The US engineered wealth transfer from Ukraine to Washington liquidated about 80% of the Russo-Ukrainian economy in all sectors. To place this cataclysm in any other position is similar to analyzing Hitler without mentioning the Versailles Treaty. Yet, in academia, both are normally done and, at the same time, pass peer-review.

The classic idea of Realism is that states are united entities that seek their own self interest in an anarchic global climate. This self interest is usually defined as the search for security at the expense of their neighbors. Realism is a simple approach to international relations that has its strengths, especially its ability to create crisp, easy to understand models, and its

drawbacks, namely in the area of the state itself and the groups that come to control it. While too much is ignored in realist theory, it serves as an excellent introduction to the way states behave in the absence of an overarching world government. In other words, realism serves as an excellent foundation in analyzing state behavior, through it must be supplemented in matters of detail from other approaches.

Any Realist worth his salt will observe the decaying USSR as an entity that was no longer able to defend itself in the Cold War environment. Economic dissolution, ethnic separatism, confused and ossified leadership, the humiliation of Chernobyl, the lost war in Afghanistan and the threats from the US under Reagan all conspired to force the USSR to slowly loosen its control over its subject states. From the point of view of the subject states such as Ukraine, Lithuania or Georgia, there was more security to be found in independence than remaining a part of a dying empire. Hence, from a simple cost benefit analysis, one can hold that the declaration of independence (after a national referendum) in 1992 was a simple exercise in rationality. There was nothing to be gained any further in being a part of an empire that was dismantling before their eyes.

Several facts, however, slowly began to emerge that challenged this basic assumption. First of all, the dependence on Russian gas and oil supplies harmed the “benefit” side of the independence equation. Only by plugging into other sources of supply and finance could this be overcome. Secondly, given the fact that the newly poor Ukrainian state could not maintain the old soviet stock of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, these were given back to Russia, with Ukraine swearing off all nuclear weapons forever. This gave an edge to Russia (or the CIS) in military power over the newly independent states. Thirdly, the Ukraine could not afford to pay the old Soviet pensions and salaries to the high tech sector, leading to elite groups largely dissatisfied with the emerging independent system. Lastly, large minorities of Russian speakers in the eastern part of Ukraine served as a major brake on any real consolidation of state independence (Motyl, 51-52).

Realism then slowly dissipates in the face of the facts: the Ukrainian state was not necessarily viable, it could not fill the gap left by the old soviet economy, and there were too many powerful groups, especially in the resource rich east, that refused to accept an integral Ukraine. Motyl writes on his seminal book on this topic: “The post-totalitarian imperative, however, is for post-Soviet (and western) elites to realize that the successor states have virtually nothing to work with and that, while transforming what exists into something that might be possible, but doing it all at once is not” (Motyl, 52).

Concerning realism and the unity of the state, Motyl adds, “They are homelands of particular nations, which can serve as ready made vehicles of consensus, civil society and political stability” (Motyl, 54). But this is precisely what Ukraine does not have. The Ukrainian heartland is in the relatively undeveloped western and southern part of the country, where Russians dominate the industrialized eastern parts (at least in the cities). While it is true that these latter areas did vote for independence in 1992, to Ukrainian nationalist movement has been stymied every time by their protests.

The disintegration of Ukrainian industry makes any economic policy a lost cause. The raw materials for reconstruction are not present. Ukraine survived the Mongols, Polish genocide, Turkish violence, Peter's depopulation schemes, Stalin's genocide and Hitler's mismanagement only to succumb to liberalism.

Dugin argues that bilingualism is not a socially significant variable, since, of itself, it does

not harm Ukrainian development or even a rich sense of identity. The ability of Russia to absorb and transform cultural elements into a usable synthesis permits the growth of Shevchenko and Franko studies within the bosom of Russian Slavophilism (which these two writers share quite a bit with).

Regardless of the tightly filtered reports on the coup in Kiev, the European Union has long been bankrupt, with a shrinking population, a total lack of identity and a degenerating work ethic. Immigrants from the third world, imported by corporate elites to work for inhuman wages, will further strain the already non-functional EU economy. Yet, even if this were a surmountable obstacle, the conditions inherent in EU and/or NATO membership are far beyond Ukraine's capabilities. The entire economy, military and political system will be remade from Brussels and Washington, as "Ukrainian nationalists" allegedly sign their nation's death warrant. This is the sort of argumentation dripping out of Columbia University and The Washington Post.

Ukraine, even under the most ideal circumstances, has no role in the EU. Germany has long made its separate peace with Russia, building a partnership that will slowly unravel the elitist and artificial EU structure. Genuine nationalist fighting for Ukrainian independence have far more in common with Russian royalists than the alienated cubicle workers in Europe. Within a Russian-led bloc, Ukraine becomes an essential part of Eurasia. As Europe and America face the prospect of total bankruptcy and purposelessness, the rising giants in Asia are just beginning their climb to power (albeit using western technology and corporate organization).

With Turkey declaring for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (in a turn of events Dugin failed to foresee) and Germany rejecting EU structures and seeking its own national interests in bilateral treaties with Moscow, the stage managed violence in Kiev is the last arrow in Soros' withered quiver.

The political work of dissident Viechslav Chornovil (d. 1999) is significant because he was able to put a strong nationalism within an ethical framework relative to Ukraine in the post-modern world. Realism appealed to him at least in the sense that an independent Ukraine requires a strong state. Her vulnerabilities and state-led economy demanded one. Corruption cannot be fought without one, and her many enemies must be kept at bay.

Like Shevchenko and much of the Ukrainian philosophical tradition, there are no rights outside of the ethnic collective. Rights must be about something and have a goal. They are not licenses that permit arbitrary behavior. The ethnic collective is made up of strong local governments, though corruption has a tendency to show itself most obnoxiously in regional economic clans.

A strong state implies the minimization of factions. Unity is needed for the sake of rebuilding and restructuring. As of 2014, not only has this not occurred, Ukraine has gone from an industrialized hub of the USSR to a fourth world hovel with no clear identity or mission. However, part of Chornovil's theory was that the core ideas of a nation cannot be destroyed. It is the essence that survives change. The sheer number of times Ukraine has been depopulated are too depressing to recount, but from Peter's revenge against Mazepa to the present demographic disaster, Ukraine has long been capable of recovering from imminent threats to its survival.

Nationalism is based on virtue: one does not sacrifice for abstract ideas of "rational choice," nor can virtue develop when there are no clear collective ends to be pursued. In times of crisis, however, the main virtue is courage. Specifically, the ability to transcend the base desire to survive by risking all for the sake of national independence and dignity.

Independence inherently imparts self-determination as a deduction. It is rare that such a view is morally understood, since self-determination never seems to apply to people, only the state. Self-determination implies discipline, moral and social sacrifice and the ability to reject one's own petty interests for the sake of broad social goals. Of course, without a society (connoting unity and identity), there are no social goals.

If there is one approach that can create usable models for Ukrainian and Russian economic relations, it is Dependency. This approach has been the bane of Ukraine's existence since independence in 1992. Ukraine existed as part of the Soviet periphery, and hence, dependency theory holds many challenges for an independent Ukraine. There are two ways to define dependency here. First, that the USSR was dependent on Ukraine for much. This includes iron and steel, literate scientific elites (Ukrainians were over-represented in the USSR's elite groups), as well as providing for over 40% of Russian grain during the Soviet era. These are not negligible items. Hence, one might say that realism will win the day, in that the Ukrainian mentality is that an Ukrainian economy for Ukrainian people would automatically lead to prosperity, given the advantages of the Ukrainian economy itself. However, this was to prove false. The soviet economy was an integral unity, where Ukraine was one part (albeit a central part) of this integrity. Hence, given that Ukraine was “built” as a dependent entity on the entire USSR, independence was irrational, since it would lead to the creation of an independent, but distorted and dependent economy.

Roman Szporluk, far more of a nationalist writer than Motyl, writes, “It is obvious that today's Ukraine cannot be considered merely a part of soviet space. Ukraine is not only linked to Russia but also to the countries Central Europe and the Black Sea region.” (Szporluk, 364). The conclusion is that independence made perfect sense from both a geographic and economic point of view, since Ukraine had many weapons to break the bonds of dependency. This included ties with central Europe and the use of the large Black Sea coast to build a strong merchant marine. Russia, however, had its weapons these included a large Russian minority in the east, and the big variable, Russian oil and natural gas, the real engine of Ukrainian dependence. The Soviet empire was based on the idea of mutual dependence both for the sake of control over the periphery as well as economic rationality.

The dependency approach here can be defined as making up specific areas of concern for our topic:

- The concept of “distortion,” where the economy of Ukraine (and all the dependent states of the old USSR) is fashioned by the imperial center, Moscow in this case, for the interests not of Ukraine, but of the entire USSR. Hence the economy is distorted, built over 70 years to serve something other than the Ukrainian population as a whole. It is a part of a larger entity.
- The creation of an elite class that is a part of the imperial design, not the national entity. In Ukraine's case, it is basically the membership in the Ukrainian Communist Party, recruited, trained and supervised by the all Soviet party and hence, “cosmopolitan” in scope, they were a-national and hence, would form a negative group in the declaration of independence.
- These oligarchies serve as a brake on real development. This is because their professional and financial interest is served in serving the empire, and hence, their rule will always inhibit a real national growth.
- Lastly, dependency also posits that the nature of economic growth in a system of dependency

means that many areas of the economy will be chronically underdeveloped, since, at least in the Soviet case, other areas important to national growth were being dealt with elsewhere in the empire. Hence, upon independence, many basic areas of economic development would be radically undernourished or non-existent. In Ukraine, this includes the banking sector and public health (Kubálkova, 100).

Hence, Dependency tells us much about the relations between these two states after independence. Making matters worse, many Ukrainian nationalists (manifested in the 2004 Orange Revolution) sought closer ties with the west as a means of breaking ties with Russia. But this begs the question of a new form of dependence upon western aid and diplomatic support, itself a distorting factor in Ukraine's development.

Ivan Dziuba, one of the remaining nationalist dissidents from the era of the “sixtiers” follows Chronivil in building a concept of nationalism that is specifically Ukrainian. Nationalism in this case serves to protect the economy from the manipulation, speculation and uncertainty of international financial forces over which nations have minimal control. An empire is the polar opposite of a nation, despite the jejune claims of the academic class. No imperial entity was simultaneously. Tsar Nicholas I distrusted nationalism for this very reason. Empires are federations of ethnic groups that can either benefit from or be exploited by the powers in the capital.

Unfortunately, Dziuba advocated a strong tendency towards European integration, but considering his life under the USSR, this is hardly blameworthy. Today, the west is dying. It cannot pay its debts, it is in a state of constant war, its native stock is not reproducing, few trust elites and the financial oligarchy, especially since 2008, has shown itself openly as the only cohesive ruling class. There is nothing to be gained, and much to lose, by trading one dependency for another.

Dependency, the opposite of self-determination, must be fought. If dependence on the will of others is an evil for a person, then it is equally evil for a society. Dependency, given the sheer volume of power wielded by a few banks, is not an easy dragon to slay. Dziuba argues that several ingredients are needed to make independence something other than a word. First, the old folk traditions should be restored. The USSR and western liberalism have artificially destroyed them. They need to be rehabilitated as does the village that nursed them.

Integrity, secondly, is the symbiosis of different functional groups, regions and mentalities in the country with the purpose of creating true unity. Symbiosis suggests that society is an integrated whole differing in function and regional specialization. This not only is consistent with nationalism, but is required by it. Only the capitalist state sees itself as absolute, while seeing the population as mere disembodied egos.

Third, national unity is achieved by a strong integration of national history, its philosophical implications and its native theology. Ukraine is an Orthodox nation whose heritage was forcibly eliminated by Polish noble clans, Peter's secularizing contempt and Soviet persecution. Ukraine has always defined its ethnic identity as connected to its Orthodoxy, and therefore, Orthodoxy as social and political goals of significance.

Unfortunately, the uniat movement was also imposed by force, and the stubborn loyalty to this mutated hybrid religion has more to do with rejecting Russian control than theology. The unia has no theology – it uses a truncated and Latinized “Byzantine” liturgy with the occasional Catholic idea (such as purgatory) thrown in, creating a hodge-podge of undigested Christian

ideas with no inherent connection. It has no coherence and no purpose.

If the cosmopolitan emptiness of global capitalism was to ever become a reality, says Dziuba, it would be the death of thought. One official idea would be left, and nominalist-positivist ideology would offer no means to critique it. All would come down to ego gratification within a virtual corporate matrix. It is not human, it is not life, and it cannot think. The very assertion that there is such a thing as “European values” or an “international community” shows the vapidness and cynicism of the globe's would be rulers. While condemning nationalism as “mythical,” these contrived conceptions are accepted as real.

Alexander Dugin holds that Russia, along with Brazil, India and China, make up the semi-periphery. The essential concept is that economic forces make international history. Economics is fetishized into ideologies that serve the interests of the metropolitan centers. In his analysis of Dependency in his Theory of a Multipolar World, he summarizes its mentality in several concepts, which can be reduced to the idea that the political class is promoted as having economic power. Profits accrue to private actors, while politicians take the blame for failures. Then, relative to Russia, he states,

Russia's sovereignty depends on the ability of Central Europe to achieve freedom in the face of the US and China to maintain and fortify its influence in the Pacific. In turn, Europe and China, as well as all other possible civilizations, become even more dependent on Russia's ability to indicate the demands of global rule and to create a coalition of Eurasian continental alliances. Therefore, the strategic project of defending its own social independence makes Russia unique. She will assist the building of this reality elsewhere, regardless of distance (Dugin, 2012: 4.4).¹⁶

Constructivism too is an essential part of understanding Russo-Ukrainian relations. It analyzes the vision that political and economic elites have of both themselves and the “other.” Both the self and the other are constructed from materials coming from history, economics and political issues. In this case, perception is the key, and perception, in this case, has much to do with international relations since reality is not important, only its interpretation (Guzzini, 119).

For Dugin, the initial Russian vision had Kiev at its center. The Mongol occupation changed this, and shifted Rus' from a Central European to a Eurasian power. As this occurs, Kiev becomes part of the western fringe of Russia, largely under the rule of Poland, Austria and the Cossack state. These had little relation to the developing Muscovite tsardom.

The most significant element was the civilizational status of Moscow. The anomaly of St. Petersburg pushes elite Russia to the west, but her core is Eurasian. Ukraine, influenced by Poland and Central Europe, is a nation. Russia is now a civilization. The understanding of Kiev as a nation rather than a civilization underscores its vulnerability.

This can be applied to the relations between Russian and Ukraine rather easily. The

¹⁶ Суверенитет России напрямую зависит от того, сможет ли континентальная Европа добиться самостоятельности перед лицом США, а Китай – сохранить и укрепить свое влияние в Тихоокеанском регионе. В свою очередь, Европа и Китай, а также все остальные потенциальные «большие пространства» в еще большей степени зависят от способности России отразить вызов глобализации и создать систему евразийских континентальных альянсов. Поэтому стратегическая задача отстаивания собственной самостоятельности обществом, совершенно не похожим на другие общества, заставляет его тесно сотрудничать с потенциальными партнерами по многополярности, как бы далеко они не находились.

Russian construction of reality is based on the integral idea of Russian space, which includes Ukraine. Russian elites in general will point to the existence of common languages and approaches to political science, and the long term relations between the two states as both a part of the Tsarist and Soviet empire. But these facts do not make up the construction, they are the material conditions of the construction that Ukraine is Russia.

In Dugin's view (manifest in the book above), Constructivism has its strength in that it deals primarily with the creation of “consensus.” On the one hand, it takes from the ethnic and historical fundament of a nation in developing basic policy. Foreign and domestic issues are not distinct. On the other, it also covers the nature of a manipulated or artificial consensus typical of western capitalism.

Gogol's uncompleted work on Ukrainian history takes an appealing view on Russo-Ukrainian relations that rarely appears even in detailed treatments. His simple argument is that a) Russia and Ukraine developed differently due to the political environment that created them; b) that, due to similarities that cannot be ignored, Ukrainian autonomy is certainly an ethical imperative, but one that is close to Russia. Drahamanov, Kulish, Kotlyarevskiy and Gogol himself promoted a Ukrainian mission without excluding Russia.

In more contemporary terms, social-nationalist politician Olexander Moroz has a coherent and defensible understanding of these mutual constructions. Constructions are inherently problematic in an era where social unity is non-existent, and state forms remain fluid and changing. There is nothing to construct, and any stereotype will be false. Only liberal modernity could possibly have developed this view of social relations because, since Kant, reality has been considered as much a creation of the mind as it is an interpretation of external objects.

Moroz refuses to permit constructions to distort the import of events since 1989. There is an oligarchy, they manipulated privatization in their own interest, and the west (that is, financial and academic elites) supported the process. This does not mean a farmer from Minnesota caused the Ukrainian meltdown or that there is an integral “west” to make reference to. These are merely abbreviations for more complex “communities” of power. Western science has long been positivist, and nominalism has disastrously become the default epistemology of the herd. These ideologies are constructions, not the analysis of them.

Facts matter, but only in their interpretation of current events. The facts of this long association is interpreted in two different ways. For Russia it is proof of identity, for Ukraine it is proof of empire and distorted development. Moroz's view might be summarized like this:

- The results of privatization can accurately be described as semi-industrial “feudalism.” Ultimately, liberalism is not as vapid as it seems, it is the rule of capital and the manipulation of demand. It is an imperial ideology eternally seeking cheap labor to exploit and raw materials to plunder.
- It is no accident that the oligarchs rejected single-member district voting. This is because such a system has a geographical focus, while capitalism and financial speculation does not. Land is seen as a commodity since it is the primary asset of farmers. It often becomes collateral for loans and hence, entire societies can fall into the hands of a handful of speculators.
- Private property is a mystification. Mystification and constructivism are not entirely distinct. Capital must rule through images, slogans and prime facie plausible ideologies. Politicians are the public face of the financial and industrial clans. Moroz argues that capitalism cannot be

reduced to competition, or that private property (that is, capital) is its core idea. Competition is eliminated through financial consolidation, and capital slowly becomes the property of a handful.

- Pseudo-nationalist agitation against Russia is artificial and designed to blame her for all Ukrainian problems. It is false nationalism because it sees the EU as the future of Ukraine, which cancels Ukrainian independence just as thoroughly as Marxism. Numerous polls show the majority of Ukrainians having positive views of both Eurasian integration and Russia in general. However, it is equally significant that only a small minority want to reestablish some form of the old USSR.

The above strongly suggests that the agitation against Russia is mystification; a construction of the west based on stereotypes and self-interest. Ukraine's educated population, natural resources and strategic location are essential to continued elite control in the west. What Moroz advocates is a modernized army, a revitalization of the village, state-directed investment in several strategic areas, labor corporations that can negotiate with firms on an equal footing, the creation of a domestic market and a market-based society with substantial regulation and social insurance.

In his "Open Letter to Yanukovytsch" (2013) Moroz argues, with little controversy, that Ukraine is experiencing another "Ruin." Elections are a farce, since political parties have nothing to do with politics, but represent the interest of economic and regional elites. Moroz's agenda is expanded upon in this letter. "Folk Orthodoxy," that is a UOC tightly bound to local tradition, is required to show the true ends of life in contradistinction to the hedonistic consumption of capital. The strong must support the weak, as the church preaches. Labor should receive the due value of their work and have a substantial say over corporate policy. The present political system of Ukraine has been designed for elite rule: President and Prime Minister, both powerful, check each other, meaning that leadership is impossible and the clans operate freely.

Five million hectares of Ukrainian land is presently owned by foreigners which, if permitted to continue, cancel any hope for independence. Oligarchy functions by transferring their debt to others, using bribery and favors to remove private debt and the state to pay their public debts. In the most extreme way, Ukraine is an example of the complete externalization of costs and internalization of profit. Oligarchy produces nothing. They live parasitically from the work of others, and, worse, the work of generations prior. They take over profitable companies, take all the value-added for themselves, and then, when little remains, they sell off the company in pieces.

Finally, east and west are also mystifications. While capitalist oligarchy is definitely western in origin, it does not typify the west as a whole. The USSR was imperial and violent, but this does not mean Russians are inherently imperial. Constructionism is not a "theory" of national life or international politics, it is an admission that elites manipulate images for the sake of distorting and falsifying reality.

As of 2014, eastern Ukraine remains nationalist in the countryside. That they are silent shows how urban power dominates the rural. For example, parishes of the Kievan Patriarchate might be an indicator of national concepts. The diocese in Dnipropetrovsk has 142 substantial parishes. Chernigov diocese has about 132 (though many remain illegal). During World War II, the OUN had a huge organization in the east, with about 5000 fighters and a large support network. Both German and Soviet documents mention this. In fact, most Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals are from eastern Ukraine.

Constructionism is useful when dealing with definitions of “Ukrainian.” For many years, describing oneself as “Russian” had no relation to ethnicity or language. It meant that they were of the upper class, urban and educated. Ukraine was depopulated in the east after the war, and former Red army veterans settled there. Eastern Ukraine retains a substantial nationalist population, but these are mostly in the countryside rather than the cities.

The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine is also focused on the question of dependency, and looks to Russia and the Eurasian Union to remove itself from the moribund EU. Only about 30% of Ukrainian trade with the EU, while 50% is with the CIS. The EU trade is mostly primary products, while trade with the CIS is high value added. Independence really meant the looting of Ukraine; the crisis, beginning in 2007, was created by speculation and usury. It is clear that the modern economy is destroying itself, as most of the world's wealth is in the hands of banks and speculators. In Ukraine, 80% live below the poverty line, and as a result, about 20% want reunification with Russia and 81% want a strong customs union with Eurasia. This is about 65-70% in western Ukraine.

PN Symmonenko, part of the National Communist movement, accepts a Titoist approach to socialism. He sees any turn to the west in Ukrainian history to have been a disaster. Today, Ukraine offers little to the west, but would be integral to Eurasia. Ukraine has immense economic potential, but the IMF, insisting on primary exports, is already dismantling what is left of Ukraine. Small and medium firms in private hands. Oligarchy is the enemy of mankind and any allies are accepted against them. Ukrainian capitalists are not part of the nation, but seek short term profit at the behest of the EU, seeking only cheap labor and raw materials. Production based largely on credit cannot last. This is the nature of the western crisis.

Both Vitrenko and Symmonenko argue that capitalism is oligarchy. It is less efficient than central planning and less just. Capitalism is immoral both in its foundations and its psychological effects. National Communism sees a strongly pan-Slavic nationalism, Eurasian integration and a clear rejection of the west, that is incapable of stopping its own decline. Capitalism is separating the economy from any other values. It stresses short term profits at the expense of the common good. Its view of private property amounts to oligarchy, since most property is in the hands of the few. Ethnic unity, the non-aligned movement, withdraw from the IMF and a focus on domestic production, corporate organization and a basic equity is the path to recovery.

X. Since Maidan and the Donetsk Crisis

**Novorossya:
The Final Confrontation of Christian Community against
Necrotic Individualism and Liberal Histrionics**

**Matthew Raphael Johnson
(МЭТЬЮ РАФАЭЛЬ ДЖОНСОН)**

Chambersburg, Pennsylvania USA

The “gas crisis” between Ukraine and Russia was the proximate cause of the present escalation of western attacks on Russia. Thus far, there is no evidence that anyone other than the endlessly suffering Ukrainian citizen will be affected. Worse, the west has put its bet on Ukraine: a fourth world basket-case. This, more than anything else, shows what can happen when energy interests control foreign policy in this regard.

In late 2013, the world was shocked to see popular protest against the Kiev government reach a level of violence thought to be seen only by elite college students in Seoul. Strangely, the police forces, regardless of the attacks on them (often suspiciously professional) received no response. However, once the coup was complete, the new “government” then used extreme levels of violence to defend its ill-gotten goals.

A small minority of Ukrainians removed the President, Viktor Yanukovich, whose views represent the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, and accepted the installation of a Washington-approved prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Soon after, he received loans from the IMF, the EU and the US and enforced the liquidation of Ukrainian firms to repay Kiev's debt. He was immediately dumped as soon as those bills were signed, his usefulness spent.

In a report from the Kiev Institute of Sociology (2013), Russia is not seen as an imperialist monster by Ukrainians. Generally, Ukraine is pro-Russia. Western Ukrainians are also pro-Russian, but few desire any reunification with Moscow. This proves that the simple-minded “east-west” divide reported in the American media is false. In the east of the country, positive views of Russia are almost at 100%. Western Ukraine, especially given the different economies of the two countries, a generally pro-Russian position is held by about 75% of the population. Between 10-20% of Western Ukraine has a negative assessment of Russia.

So what happened? Julia Tymoshenko is the primary oligarch in that country. For the second time, she has relied on the west to place her in power. Convicted more than once on numerous corruption charges, the US immediately declared her innocent regardless of the actual facts of the case (Sakwa, 2008, 184). The US position is that, because these charges came from Russia or a government that is dominated by the Party of Regions, they could not be accurate. However, when former President Yushchenko, her former ally, repeated the same accusations, the west fell silent.

She was convicted of using government funds to bail out her gas monopoly. Once her enemies and her allies saw her as a criminal, she made a well publicized trip to Moscow, claiming that “she was pro-Putin all along.” Once the protests turned violent, Tymoshenko was released from prison and then claimed that she was for the “movement for freedom.” As soon as Yatsenyuk was installed, the Ukrainian criminal code was simply rewritten that decriminalized only those crimes that would affect the oligarchy.

The violence in Kiev was financed by the US, and had been planned for some time.

Ambassador Victoria Nuland had been captured on film passing out cookies as the Molotov cocktails were hurled. She also openly admits to spending \$6 billion to organize the opposition, hence putting an end to that debate. Groups like these need to be organized artificially because of their small numbers and lack of any unifying vision.

John McCain told the protesters to step up their violence upon his arrival in Kiev last month, yet complains when military forces the world over say the same about the US. Having dinner with protest groups long claiming to demand the ouster of the government by force, the US promised to pay the new government a substantial sum. This is the sole foundation of the present government in Kiev, or what remains of it.

The ideology of this movement has been a bit of a mystery. First, there was the claim that the protesters were “fighting for liberalism.” Every major American newspaper had originally argued this, including all neo-conservative outlets. The problem was the clear self interest displayed by this dishonesty. Moreover, since very few Ukrainians accept the liberal view, and that western liberalism is almost universally blamed for the crisis that began under Kravchuk and has yet to end, this was quietly scrapped.

Then, there was something about the European Union being at the heart of this. The problem there was that a) this is not an issue that usually causes violence, b) this is just another variant of the liberal theme, c) there is no reason to believe that a population willing to “rebel” over Yanykovich's decision to move into Eurasian markets would also believe that Ukrainian goods have any chance in the west and d) that 70% of Ukrainian exports are to the east. The west has hardly the market for its own goods, let alone those created in eastern Ukraine (which are made from Russian components regardless).

Finally, there was the “nationalist” opinion. This was intriguing, except that Stepan Bandera, his movement in the OUN, as well as Dontsov, Poltava, Gogol, and the rest rejected any interaction with the decadent western European powers. In fact, no nationalist of any consequence in Ukraine had nothing but contempt and revulsion for the west. Hence, the western world, whose knowledge of the Ukrainian economy is equivalent to their knowledge of cellular antisense transcription, was yet again sold a bill of goods.

The local elites financing this coup were Sergey Taruta and Igor Kolomoisky. They have been appointed by western capital to take control the eastern industries and sell them to pay debts to financial capital and major western energy firms. Kolomoisky was a long-time ally of Tymoshenko and in the early 2000s, was involved in her notorious gas-siphoning operation. In brief, these oligarchs can sell off Ukraine and pocket all profits before the currency completely collapses. Since corporate debt at the time of the coup was a full 14% of GDP, they needed this violence as the last hope of making some money on the failing Ukrainian experiment.

The west, yet again, promised aid, credit and trade with any government that would take over from Yanukovich. Now, it is not like there are no good reasons to protest against Kiev, but the hijacking of yet another mass movement by NGOs and western capital could not but lead to the same disasters as 2004. Of course, Ukraine cannot receive credit, since she possesses no functional capital. She has no money, little income and an impoverished population dependent on the black market to survive. There can be no trade since there is no demand in the west for Ukrainian goods. Aid is not forthcoming from an indebted, oligarchic western world whose banks are quite busy foreclosing on its own middle class. Hence, even the American population could conclude that this is no concern of the American taxpayer.

As all Russian commentators predicted, the western promises were cynical, false and

easily repudiated. Aid quickly became “loans” and “loans” really meant selling chunks of Ukrainian land to Shell and Exxon. Naftogaz, the bankrupt Ukrainian gas organization, immediately increased its rates by 50% starting on May 1 of 2014. Government workers will be receiving withholding rates of between 40% and 70% of salary depending on rank. The typical middling Kievan civil servant makes roughly 1000-2000 hryvnia monthly, which is not a living wage. All remaining social services will be slashed and its government reorganized by Kiev's creditors.

Even worse, Kiev, one of the most glorious cities in European history, is now Europe's Detroit. That comparison is pathetically apt because Kievan state will be governed by Brussels according to EU law. Decisions in Detroit are now made in Ann Arbor: that's what being in receivership means. Kiev is now a colony of Brussels in the same manner as Kosovo. The only problem is not how this will affect Moscow, but how a completely bankrupt EU will now take on the additional burden of a financially non-viable Ukraine. The only solution is for western capital to buy up Ukrainian assets at next to nothing prices and liquidate them. This would mean the end of both Ukrainian political and financial sovereignty. The result was the perfectly rational and quite noble uprising of the two eastern industrial regions of Donetsk and Lugansk who would rather not be so absorbed. Their goods are not only accepted in the east, but are in high demand.

The Republic of Novorossya is the true subject of this paper, but this background is essential. In their July 4 declaration of independence, the new government stated:

Ukraine has been the victim of a coup with the support of all elite bodies and paramilitary forces. The new government is frantically searching for legitimacy and has, as a result, gone to the west for protection. Worse, they have signed all manner of agreements that eliminate what independence remained with western capital. In the process this new “government” has severed itself from the rest of the Slavic world. They have instituted a massive program of media censorship and use anti-Russian prejudice as their local propaganda. They created a “Russian image” that is now an enemy. Today, Kiev is a colony of western capital. The people of the Donetsk region sees Eurasia as the future, not the west. There can be no cooperation with an illegitimate government run by criminals. We support the essential principles of international law and human values, which presently cannot be observed after the coup. The will of our people is clear and the Regional Council of the Donetsk Region proclaims the official establishment of an independent state (July 4, 2014).

Paul Gubarev's article “We are Building a New Russia” (2014) (Мы строим новую Россию!) lays the groundwork for the ideology of the Donbass state. “Our land should become a clear testament to social justice. The massive gap between the rich and poor needs to be eliminated. . . .Offshore business will be banned and taxes reduced to 10% across the board.” There is little to argue with here, which is why this author is the first to translate it.

He goes on to describe a full tax amnesty for small business and overall, a general spirit of Orthodox brotherhood. These elements will help make New Russia the very vanguard of Russian Civilization. Kiev was a state based on theft: if this capital had been put to productive use, Ukraine would be a European power of the first rank. That most of the high value-added

exports from Ukraine came from the Donbass, their economic exploitation is a fact of life and hence, their secession is justified on these grounds alone.

Apart from the fact that “Euro-Maidan” was merely a debt collection arrangement by western firms burned yet again by Ukrainian insolvency, the devastated Ukrainian citizen, with more advanced degrees per capita than any other country on the globe, will see medical services cut, education intermittent and electricity and heat only on occasion. Even more, tax rates have been massively increased on diesel fuel while all previous tax reductions, credits and rebates have been canceled. Taxes will be levied on currency purchases, radio band usage, a increased VAT, bank deposits, the disabled and an endless array of additionally regressive, absurd and almost-made-up targets. No one who knows Ukrainian economics believes these can be paid or enforced unless the EU directly rules Ukraine, which of course, it lacks the resources to do.

On the other hand, the speaker of the Crimean State Council, Vladimir Konstantinov, now safely under the powerful and dynamic economy of Eurasia, has increased pension payments to the level of the Russian. China has, almost at the moment the referendum returned the predicted 92% margin for joining with Russia, begun building a colossal energy plant offshore while Moscow has already laid plans for substantial investment in the region at about \$5 billion in agricultural, tourist and energy projects. Hence, Ukraine will see whatever is left being sold off at 50% market while the Crimea suffers a labor shortage.

Valentin Katasonov, one of the best political writers in Russia today, argues that Novorossya was necessary to protect Russians against the coming collapse of the hryvnia. Its collapse is a fact, but artificial injections of liquidity are presently keeping it afloat. The best thing is for Russia to float a substantial loan to jump start the economy and place the ruble as the main currency. At a minimum, a loan would permit an independent ruble in the Donbass, but there seems to be no rationale for that.

As of this writing, August 27 of 2014, the hryvnia is in a state of total collapse. The hapless prime minister called on western banks to, yet again, throw money at an unsolvable problem. The Ukrainian currency has now dipped to 15:1 against the dollar and is falling. Since there is no production or confidence in the system, nothing will give it strength except foreign aid. Thus, this can only be the beginning, since the political will to adopt a fourth world state with no prospects under western rule is not exactly politically popular.

In addition, official statistics released from Kiev are predictably depressing. Most Ukrainian businesses have recorded monstrous losses. As of late August, they amounted to \$140 billion since January. The other fact that the west probably cannot digest is that about 50% of the companies in Ukraine have increased profits substantially at the same time. It does not take brilliance to understand that these profitable firms are not Ukrainian at all, but represent the European or American buyouts of Ukrainian capital. These are ledger entries only. When the west streamlines a business, eliminates its capital and fires its workers, this is seen as a net gain since capital valuations will rise and depreciation fall. The mere movement of cash in an area is not economic growth nor profitability. It also has nothing to do with production. Profits in speculating on Ukrainian capital are not “profits” in any real sense of the term, but Kiev is not honest about this.

The worst part about having insight into these things is that you are almost always right.

That does not sound like a problem until you add the fact that no one listens. The absurdly illegitimate government of someone named Yatsenyuk has, predictably, began calling the liquidation of Ukrainian assets “privatization.” The All-Ukrainian agrarian forum during the first week of July 2014, was the odd vehicle for this announcement.

Any profitable company will be privatized. He neglected to mention that the criminal code of Ukraine has been rewritten directly by western capital making it very easy for them to buy what they require to regain some of their bad loans. All state-owned companies are being sold. Ominously, “Ukrspirit,” the firm that produces 95% of all Ukrainian grain alcohol, will be sold off to western creditors.

Law enforcement will be substantially cut, with the Kievan authorities shedding over 50,000 personnel. While this is not normally part of the typical IMF austerity program, it will remove most of the irritations of law and order from oligarchical pilfering. All social services will be slashed over 50% over the next year. VAT taxes are averaging 20% and are increasing. Tobacco, alcohol, engines, and imports will be taxed monstrously.

Almost in a mocking tone, this mouthpiece of the EU's coup in Kiev stated, “The main challenge facing Ukraine is to take the lead in the European food market. . . We need to feed its citizens with cheap, quality products and hence, take European food markets.” Those who follow EU politics realize just how the agricultural lobby in Brussels will take such news. A few districts in Belgium can easily feed all the EU and beyond. Like all else, Ukraine is not geared towards a western market. Ukrainian food is no doubt of high quality, it's just that no one in Norway will develop rickets without it.

Similarly comical was his belief that “Ukraine will take over the American corn market.” It is doubtful that this mouthpiece, hence callously discarded as useless, believes this nonsense, especially since the former “prime minister” called the future of endless cuts and high taxes the “most brutal economy” awaiting Ukraine.

One example might suffice. In Ukraine, roughly since 2003, the market for poultry has become saturated. Since Ukraine does grow and process high grade poultry, the export market was quickly developed. Ukrainian exports of this product went up this time by the summer of 2013 by about 250%. the problem was that it went to Russia and Eurasia, which, regardless, accounted for 70% of all Ukrainian exports.

There was a special “permission” granted from Brussels to Kiev that lowered tariffs for Ukrainian poultry, but this cost the EU in compensatory payments to their own suffering farmers. Even when the tariffs were dropped to zero, the total amount sold to EU customers amounted to 40,000 tons. Since Ukraine produces about 2 million tons of poultry product a year, this was not an impressive means of “taking Europe's food market.”

This is significant because, quite naturally, President Yanukovytych saw Eurasia as the future of Ukraine rather than the EU. Math is after all, math. Yet the west, threatened by the loss of another debt-ally, balked and created the “Euro-Maidan” movement. The west took advantage of many legitimate grievances to be sure, but western NGOs are expert manipulators.

So far, the losses registered for Ukrainian enterprises in the first quarter of 2014 rose by 550%, while the total negative balance for the private sector as a whole is about 130 hryvnias, or about \$11 billion, according to the National Bank of Ukraine. The policies of the junta in Kiev have directly led to a drop in capital investment to about one-quarter of last year's.

Given the disruption of trade with Russia (not including the loss of the Donbass or Crimea) will be a minimum of \$33 billion yearly, about 15-17% of GDP. Of this, about \$15

billion is now based on losses from Eurasian trade. A further reduction will occur when Kiev finally admits that there is no market for Ukrainian goods in a western world that barely has a market for western goods. Often left out of these considerations is the loss of possible \$10-12 billion yearly from migrant workers in Russia and Central Asia, a fill 7% of GDP.

The gas crisis was the proximate cause of the mess that presently torments the east. To summarize: Russia is one of the world's largest producers of natural gas. Ukraine has been an important customer for decades. However, in the 1990s, as Ukraine was nearly liquidated by the west and its local agents, the gas debt with Russia grew. As infrastructure grew older and more damaged, the costs of this relationship grew in proportion. The present bill owed to Gazprom is about \$5 billion.

Unable to pay this bill, but unwilling to admit to total and complete bankruptcy, Kiev gambled on western support. They bet correctly, and Kiev will continue to play the west's tune so long as it does not have to pay this bill and the accruing interest. After all, her currency has no production to sustain it, and her infrastructure could not handle any serious economic growth regardless. As transport infrastructure falls apart, elites have every incentive to take what they can before the entire edifice falls.

The first step was for Kiev to declare itself an enemy of Russia. It did not take long before the west's NGOs moved in. Often omitted is the fact that Ukraine has, for decades, paid below market costs for gas. When Moscow, seeing an enemy across her southeastern border, raises the price to market levels, Kiev accuses Moscow of price gouging. Yet Moscow had continued to subsidize Ukrainian gas even after independence.

From 1991 to 1996, Ukraine has been shedding its GDP from between 10% and 25% yearly. She suffered hyperinflation, and monstrous concentration of wealth in a few families (only a handful of whom are Ukrainian). Infrastructure fell to pieces, and few roads are presently reliable. After losing over half its GDP in the 1990s, very little developed in terms of recovery since the lack of confidence encouraged bandit behavior rather than investment. As of 2012, Ukraine's capital depreciation is about 300% more rapid than in the west.

Less promising for Ukraine is that its relationship to Russia is based on natural gas. This is about half of the total economic relations between the two countries. All of Ukraine's manufacturing is dependent on Russian components, and most of these concerns are situated in the east and south.

Yet, the problem for the junta is the fact that Russian nationalists control much of the eastern manufacturing. Hence, the hapless Yatsenyuk was ordered to appoint regional bosses to oversee the liquidation of these companies. Needless to say, the natives got restless and began arming themselves, as any rational people would do. The Ukrainian army is poorly equipped and has never reformed itself to be anything other than an important appendage of the USSR. Most Ukrainians are refusing to fire on easterners, and some estimates put the number of desertions at 500 daily. What is being created before our eyes is a new Russian state of "NovoRossya" or the "People's Republic of the Donbass."

As Ukraine is mired in fourth world status, Novorossya, alternatively, is to become the heart of Eurasia. She is saturated with coal, iron ore, manganese, metallurgical and chemical industries and the strong ports of Odessa, Mariupol and the Nikolayev shipyard in Crimea to transport them. This also does not include the investments made by both Russia and China in this

sector. One eastern firm, Novokramatorsky Engineering Works, comprises a full 6% of Ukraine's exports. Novorossya's path is going to be prosperous.

Further, Transnistria, which is largely a small region of mostly Russian professionals, will be free from the rest of Moldova and then, along with Carpathian-Rus, Crimea and New Russia, will create a new industrial hub of the Eurasian economy.

Hence, New Russia will be the center of inorganic raw materials for Eurasia, its aeronautics and shipbuilding hub, be the site of Russian forward bases on the Black Sea against NATO and into the Mediterranean. Her future is bright so long as Putin or those thinking as he does remain at the helm. Russia is largely immune to western pressure, since she is deepening her relationship with the east rather than the west. Thus, Russian policy has no reason to even use the window dressings of liberalism.

Conclusions

Stus placed the ethnic question as a matter of personal suffering. Prosaic gratification takes the place of virtue and calls itself “progress.” Those fighting it are rounded up. Modern man can only think in binary terms: individual and society, while the nation and community are syntheses of these terms. Love ends in tragedy just as Teterya and Skoropadsky's love for the motherland led to their exile. Most of all, Stus argued that tyranny and collectivization requires a mass, not real persons.

The USSR, as Stus wrote from prison, is a “twilight” world where nothing is as it seems. The senses deceive, since the term “liberty” or “equality” is everywhere affirmed, but denied everywhere in practice. Nationalism is little more than those structures erected to protect the population from irrationality, colonial rule and exploitation. Nationalism is to see the archetype in both nature and culture and seek its realization in our nominal world. Poets can do this, so long as they suffer enough. To get what one wants is to avoid the archetype, it is not needed when desires are met. Just before his 1985 murder, Stus proclaimed that his very existence was an act of protest. Socialism did not know what to do with such people except put them in prison. One was either a proletarian New Man or he was not. The “nots” ended up as “zeks.”

The nation is a community, the individual can only be collectivized. Collectives and communes are as different as individuals from persons. The individual is an ego, a person is an acculturated being. Suffering forces one to discover the fundamentals of existence. It forces self-knowledge, but it is always dangerously close to despair.

The examples detailed above have shown that both nationalism and sovereignty are the cornerstone of international politics. Even the most predatory empire needs to use these symbols when it is in their interests. Even more, as the economies of the small Slavic states continue to spin out of control, internationalism, neoliberalism and empire are seen more and more to be illegitimate and in fact, rapacious. Belarus and Russia are exceptions, showing basically healthy economies based entirely on a rejection of IMF demands.

This writer agrees that the most successful economic policies come from a strong state and ethnic unity. Examples include including Japan, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan and Belarus. All of these states are examples of economic successes based around the rejection of neoliberalism and in favor of state-centered investment policies and long-term employment. The death of neoliberalism—outside of Washington and Harvard—will be missed by few.

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(Hobsbawm was a Jewish communist called an "authority on nationalism" by the entire academic establishment. Most of his work was promoting Marx and Marxism globally. He did not possess the qualifications to grasp nationalism nor the intellectual honesty to pursue it. He sought only to destroy it while downplaying his ethnic identity).

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