

Nation and State: An Extended Definition and Analysis

Matthew Raphael Johnson
Johnstown, PA
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Introduction

In the contemporary United States, domestic policy is an appendage of foreign policy, specifically, the U.S. global financial position. If the U.S. is to be the leader of the New Global Regime, then its domestic sense of self must be altered. The economic system of the late 18th century was based on communal farming in certain regions, yeoman landholding, state and county independence and racial and linguistic commonalities. None of that, of course, is even remotely compatible with a global empire.

Centralization, a cosmopolitan consciousness and a removal from traditional moral anchors is necessary for the consuming, rootless identity necessary to maintain a commodity-based capitalist and globalist structure, a structure, importantly, controlled by equally rootless, privately-owned entities (rather than the state, which, in the American case, is reactive and clumsy). Therefore, specific policies of the state since the second world war need to be understood in this light. This also explains the otherwise inexplicable elite support for radical social ideologies. Therefore, it might be said that the constitution only makes sense when joined with a socio-economic reality that no longer exists.

Nationalism and Scholarship

The academic literature on nationalism and ethnicity is an intellectual disaster; the harshest polemics and rants against even the most moderate nationalist position passes the phony "peer-review" process and usually renders nationalism somewhat akin to National Socialism. The concept of the nation is nearly treated as identical to the state and its apparatus, and ethnicity is little more than a residual category of all that is not covered by the ideas of "nation" or "state."

Making matters worse, the question of "nationalism" in both historical and political journals is basically critical, making the claim regularly that nationalism is a recent phenomenon based on "myth" and "manipulation." In other words, it is not an idea taken seriously. At present, it is the greatest threat to the oligarchical elites who presently control much of the globe's politics.

The academic nonsense regularly published on nationalism is based on a subtle confusion of terminology that is at the basis of my personal interest in this field: the distinction between nation, state and ethnicity. These are far from synonymous, and in many ways they are nearly exclusive of one another. In making these necessary distinctions, the central concepts of ethnic nationalism are made clear.

By ethnicity I mean a body of tradition centered on a shared language, a shared universe of meaning. Ethnicity is solely a product of history; the struggle for survival, and nearly all traditional ethnic institutions have been formed for the sake of protection, security and the basic issues of survival. In Russia's case, it is a mobilization against western aggression.

Appeals to tradition make little sense unless this universe of shared meaning exists, which is largely why the United States cannot be called a "nation," though specific regions of it can. Language is shaped by historical experience and this complex of experience and language are vital ingredients for tradition to function.

Conservatives have spent the last two hundred years speaking on the idea of "tradition," which, by itself is a meaningless abstraction, without bothering to discuss its ethnic and linguistic roots. By tradition I mean something similar to the concept of ethnicity, that is, a set of basically unspoken norms and meanings that have developed out of a people's struggle for survival.

Tradition does not make any sense outside of ethnicity. Ethnicity is the primary basis of social life because it is what philosophers call a "first order" loyalty, that is, civil society, however one conceives of it, or whatever social agenda one might have, is utterly dependent upon this universe of shared meanings that derive from historical experience, objectified in cultural institutions and language. Without it, political discourse must become a top-down affair, with attitudes and arguments administered by an (often anonymous) authority from above.

The state is ethnicity's radical opposite. What in the ethno-national collective is free-flowing and developing, the state seeks to make rigid; to compartmentalize and administer. The ethnos is based around a shared culture; the state is based upon coercion, violence and bureaucracy. The ethnic group maintains order through the tradition of its own history and development, the state relies on police, armies, psy-ops, secret agents and manipulation. The ethnic group is a diverse organism of traditional institutions and folkways while the state is based upon a culture-less, utilitarian organization of domination, control and exploitation.

The life of the ethnic organism can easily be described as the daily manifestation of the general will, that is, those things that any specific people share in common as a people; those marks that make them a specific people. It is a set of public meanings and unspoken understandings that makes all civil life possible. It is not an appeal to tradition; it is the framework of meaning that permits tradition to be understood at all.

Even further, it is the foundation of tradition, without which political or civic discussion cannot take place. It is nearly impossible to conceive of a political culture where the interplay of institutions, historical experience and a shared vocabulary are absent. It would be a merely arbitrary set of slogans backed up, inevitably by threats of violence. It is contemporary America.

The nation is another matter altogether, and it is here where the academic mentality fails completely; it is a slippery and vague concept that I often refrain from using. Depending on whom one reads, the nation is identical with the state, the ethnic group, or this non-existent monster from the vaults of academic mythology called the "nation-state."

It is not uncommon to hear one speak of the "Swiss nation," the "Iraqi nation" or the "Belgian nation" when in fact these are states—governments with arbitrary borders—that have several nations living within them. In this case the word "nation" can only mean the legally constituted state, and, if this is true, the word is useless.

This usage seems to me to be an abuse of the language. It is true that the 19th century theorists of nationalism such as G.W.F. Hegel used the term "state" to describe not merely the agencies of bureaucratic coercion we in the English speaking world refer to as the "state," but also to the cultural and linguistic complex that this state embodies. For Hegel, as well as others such as Bernard Bosanquet—and this is central—the nation, the cultural life of a people, and the state were one and the same thing.

Whether this complex shows itself as bureaucratic and coercive or communal and cultural was of no consequence, they were merely two sides of the same coin, sometimes needing to show strength, sometimes needing to create unity.

It is my opinion that this older, very continental, view is naive. Part of the confusion among the academic literature on nationalism derives from a legitimate source, the extreme difficulty of separating the pre-modern ethnic groups within Europe from the rise of the state in the 16th century and the rather artificial culture that it created.

Normally, academics such as Eric Hobsbawm or Ernst Gellner enjoy delegitimizing nationalism by claiming that it was these modern states that encouraged or even created a "national culture." Therefore, this "national culture" is synthetic and the product of manipulation, confined to the cities and a handful of intellectuals, the national culture was primarily, if not solely, the product of political manipulation.

Gellner has made the claim that "nationalism" developed only in the milieu of the statist industrial revolution, where the need for regularity and standardization that industry required, and still requires, necessitated the creation of a "national culture" that would bring all groups within its view.

This view is easy to eliminate largely because most ethnic nationalisms have developed in agrarian societies such as Ireland, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, Czechia, Ruthenia, Russia, Ukraine or Scandinavia. In the case of France in particular, it is clear that, in many respects, the "national culture" postdates the state. It might also be noted that France, up until the post World War I era, was largely pastoral.

In Germany it is quite the opposite. As the centralized French state developed in the post-revolutionary era, the Celtic ethnos in the north of the country was forbidden to speak its language or use any of its symbols. Other dialects within the state were discouraged or banned outright; in fact, this process predates the revolution. Medieval France was a mess of languages that were often mutually incomprehensible.

Now, as often as this example is trotted out, this sort of manipulation was not the case in Scotland, Russia, Scandinavia, Germany, Serbia, Greece, Russia or Poland. Certainly the Jews are another example here. Even in the absence of unifying political structures or industrialization, the more powerful agencies of language and religion unified the cultural life of these nations. These created a sense of unity and togetherness long before the state came into existence. The unified cultural life of these nations was well-known and functioning at least as early as the middle ages.

Therefore, the academic critique of nationalism presupposes agreement as to what the "nation" is. This is the problem. Generally, professional historians seem to accept the notion that state and nation are basically inseparable and that whenever anyone speaks of national culture or even ethnic tradition, one is, at least partially, speaking of a synthetic creation of the state.

Nations and States

Those, such as this writer, who stress ethnicity over the state, are certainly willing to accept this critique in certain historical cases. It is a fact that states have created cultures that are more a product of bureaucratic fantasy than historical fact. This merely obscures the point that the state builds its pseudo-nationalism on the backs of traditional, local and ethnically based institutions.

The state demands absolute loyalty; no one may use force against any other citizen except the state, and the state, therefore, is the center of political loyalty, political action and political standardization. Now, if this is the definition of "nationalism" I am not a nationalist, and I fear that most who presently call themselves nationalists would not exactly accept this definition.

Here, possibly is the main distinction between ethnos and nation. The state came into existence by destroying the independent existence of the ethnic groups that formerly developed since medieval or even ancient times. Others, such as Germany, voluntarily joined the German

Confederation because it was already a historical fact that trade and language were already joining the "Germanic peoples" together. In the United States, alternatively, the television monoculture has all but destroyed the separate ethnic nations that have always existed on its soil.

Empires in the past have generally been a-ethnic, at least in its official theory. The Habsburgs, for example, thought of themselves as a universal protector of Christendom that maintained numerous ethnic groups in basic cultural independence under its scepter. The Roman Empire tolerated and largely enfranchised ethnic politics, and the "Byzantine Commonwealth" can, at its height, only be called a confederation of ethnic principalities. The Russian Empire maintained the cultural independence of its subject nations, even going so far as to write different constitutions for different parts of the empire.

Many of the empires of years past were not states in any modern sense of the term. Many of them were wedded to medieval or ancient concepts of political authority that did not need any form of central control, and the day to day life of the peasant or artisan was regulated by the church calendar, the commune, or the guild. There was no state in the ethnic life of old Europe.

Only today, the American Imperium, the most violent and most heavily armed empire in history, has taken upon itself the mission of reducing the world's ethnicities to, at best, superficial entities in the global marketplace or, at worst, irritants to a world wide market that are slated for extinction. The American Empire treats its "global village" in the same way it has treated its own (European) ethnics, as playful indulgences without any political content whatsoever.

Nowhere is this fraud of the "nation state" more obvious than in the third world. The number of civil wars and carnage that has come from the post-colonial state system is immeasurable. Nearly every country in Africa is an artificial creation, trapping within its arbitrary borders numerous ethnic groups that often are at war with one another. Therefore, the state in black Africa is merely the plaything of western-educated native elites who either pretend that ethnicity does not exist or, more commonly, use the levers of state power to benefit one ethnic group over another.

For modern, western states and countries (and I use those terms interchangeably; the word "country" is basically meaningless), the ethnos is, at best, used for aggrandizing state power, playing on the absurdity that the state, in some sense, encapsulates the nation, or, at worst, ignored altogether as completely at odds with official liberalism and utilitarianism.

Images of the nation might be used to buttress public opinion, sell products or engender loyalty to an aggressive foreign policy, but in general, liberal societies have rendered ethnicity completely symbolic and apolitical. Ethnicity has, in western countries, been reduced to a merely ornamental indulgence, and the political uses and official mobilization of third world ethnics in western societies do not obscure this essential fact.

Therefore, it seems fair to isolate our uses of the terms "state" or "country" to refer to legal and bureaucratic entities that may or may not have any cultural function. On the other hand, ethnicity should be used only when dealing with the linguistic cultural complex that may or may not have its own state or may or may not care.

"Nation," as used in a phrase such as "a national movement" or "national liberation" is a reference to the politicization of ethnicity, or the rendering of ethnicity as being primarily political; as in the uses of ethnicity to fight against the bureaucratic violence of any particular state or empire.

However, even this restricted use of the word "nationalism" does in no manner obscure the idea that such politicized ethnic groups, though changing throughout the centuries, are a permanent fixture of world politics. From medieval Scotland to the ancient Levant, appeals to ethnicity and language are plentiful in the historical record. The more important question, though,

is the relation between the ethnic group and the state.

The first and primary purpose of the ethnos is the protection of its members. Both in terms of personal security, as well as the equally important sense of community and belonging, the ethnic group is a part of the natural order. It is a human instinct. Contrary to the conservative capitalist mythology, the "free market" is not the default organization of economic exchange, but, in reality, the historical record is unambiguous, as far back as we have written records, that men organized themselves into communes and guilds for protection against the uncertainties of political and economic life. Human beings must congregate to survive. Within this congregation develop the linguistic and moral codes that primarily serve to preserve the unity of the group from want, foreign attacks and the ravages of nature. The necessity for communication, artistic creation and education, men naturally and spontaneously have created such linguistic and semantic commonalities we now call ethnic groups or tribes.

It is because ethnic groups protect human beings from the dangers of this fallen world that ethnic groups engender loyalty to the point of complete self-sacrifice. Human beings do not die for abstract ideologies; no one ever went into battle because he recently read Rousseau's First Discourse; no one sacrifices their lives because they computed a statistical analysis that morally justifies it. Men go into battle for faith, home, family and nation. In the 21st century, nothing has changed.

It is here, within the cultural and ethnic complex of hearth and home, where a humanoid can become a man. To be immersed in a body of tradition, of experience and folklore is not the trite exercise found in bourgeois ethnic clubs or Anglo-American conservative journals, but is a historical journey into the reasons why one's people are here at all; how they survived; how they flourished.

To understand this body of information, much of it resistant to writing and understood only by immersion, is to understand the means whereby one behaves within a society such that one can contribute at a level the social organism can understand and absorb. All of this is beyond the professional competence of social science or even of philosophy, but is only the domain of life, loyalty and humility.

Culture is, by definition a collective institution, as is language. Outside of these parameters, personal communication and hence interaction is impossible. Therefore, what I am interested in building is a state of affairs where the free-flow of traditional institutions is preserved, creating a situation where each family, parish or guild is continually interacting, mutually strengthening one another and protecting one another with an eye to maximizing the autonomy of each institution, each with its own traditionally defined function and purpose, but still unified through language and historical experience.

The term "liberty" as an abstraction is meaningless. It should be granted that liberty is a freedom to do something, to commit certain definite actions for some positive purpose, but actions that are socially and culturally useful, actions that make sense within a cultural context, a context in the absence of which action would be impossible. Action is senseless unless a context exists where others can understand, profit from and learn from any action of social or moral significance. This can only take place within a thriving culture, or those shared meanings encapsulated in a common language and historical memory.

The concept of "liberty," in its vulgar and abstract sense, can only come about when the state has largely nationalized institutions and functions formerly the domain of the village, the church, or the commune. Socially useful functions such as education, health and welfare services, police, travel accommodations and public works provide the institutional framework that has

always marked out the domain of a specifically ethnic social action. This is the network that defined the rights, obligations, rewards and punishment of any specific people living within their (often informal) parameters. In other words, entitlements, as well as rights and duties, were tied to specific social actions; specific social needs. Once such functions became the domain of the state, "freedom" was quickly redefined to refer to pathetic indulgences and petty vices.

In modern societies, the domination of both corporate capital and the institutions of the state--acting, as they always have, in concert, supporting and protecting one another--has only come to be at the expense of traditional agrarian, ethnic and racial institutions and folkways. Capital and the state are far from opposites as the libertarians might claim, but grew together and therefore dominate together.

The myth of this dichotomy between corporate capital and the state is a damaging one, and it has been maintained by nearly all ideological groupings in modern societies. The development of the capitalist market developed in England due to the actions of the state. For example, the expropriation of monasteries from the time of Henry VIII on, led to thousands of peasants being driven from their ancestral lands to make room for landlords and the use of so called free, or wage labor.

The destruction of feudalism meant that peasants, who, under medieval and Christian law, had a lifetime right to their land, were driven off, and landlords took over the common lands of England (about one fifth), using wage labor then, solely at the discretion of the landlords. The state, then created the modern plantation in English history, as peasants were driven to poverty so that the state could reward its servitors, thereby making its power absolute.

The enclosure movement in England, beginning from the late renaissance and moving right into the 19th century, are a primary example of the state using its power to destroy traditional ethnic institutions and setting the stage for the exploitation of peasant labor, that is, setting the stage for the creation of the "labor market." (cf. Kevin Carson, *The Iron Fist behind the Invisible Hand: Corporate Capitalism as a State-Guaranteed system of Privilege* for a first-class understanding of this problem)

The point is that our modern, "individualist" sort of corporate ideology was the direct result of the state being used by local oligarchs to destroy traditional and ethnic arrangements that had existed in some cases since ancient times, and replace it with "the rule of law," which meant the rule of those who made the law. Ethnic custom was destroyed by the state so as to facilitate the development of oligarchic capitalism and landlordism.

The state, as feudalism developed into statist capitalism, began its centuries-old war with traditional ethnic arrangements in terms of labor and land tenure in favor of the oligarchy that created the state, and then used it, of course, for their own purposes.

The state might be understood, particularly in its post-medieval genesis, as a means whereby the regional oligarchy was able to create a standard market over a larger and larger area. At least in western Europe, the development of the state roughly went hand in hand with the development of the market.

The traditional peasant institutions and guilds that protected the rights of land tenure and maintained a decent standard of living, needed to be destroyed largely because these institutions were not market based. They were geared to security, stability and protection, while the oligarchy needed a system of "contract law" that would then tie the peasantry to him, rather to ethnic institutions. Therefore, the system of lifetime land tenure, guild protections against unfair completion and price wars, social security and unemployment insurance needed to be destroyed. Therefore, the landlord or the regional oligarchy dominated the now unprotected peasant or artisan completely, creating a situation of radical dependency. This now completely exposed and

vulnerable peasant became an "individual."

The butchery of thousands of young boys and girls in the early factory system of England and America cannot be understood without understanding the development of ideological "individualism" so uncritically accepted today.

The entire ideological apparatus of "individual liberties" derived from this obsession of the modern ruling classes. "Individualism" meant the stripping of feudal protections from the peasant, rendering him isolated and alone. Once the peasantry lost their land to the rule of law, they quickly swelled the cities, becoming alienated proletarians. Carson writes:

The working class lifestyle under the factory system, with its new forms of social control, was a radical break with the past. It involved the drastic loss of control over their own work. The seventeenth century work calendar was still heavily influenced by medieval custom. Although there were long days in spurts between planting and harvest, intermittent periods of light work and the proliferation of saints days combined to reduce average work-time well below our own. And the pace of work was generally determined by the sun or the biological rhythms of the laborer, who got up after a decent night's sleep, and sat down to rest when he felt like it. The cottager who had access to common land, even when he wanted extra income from wage labor, could take work on a casual basis and then return to working for himself. This was an unacceptable degree of independence from a capitalist standpoint. . . .

The factory system could not have been imposed on workers without first depriving them of alternatives, and forcibly denying access to any source of economic independence. No unbroken human being, with a sense of freedom or dignity, would have submitted to factory discipline. Stephen Marglin compared the nineteenth century textile factory, staffed by pauper children bought at the workhouse slave market, to Roman brick and pottery factories which were manned by slaves. In Rome, factory production was exceptional in manufactures dominated by freemen. The factory system, throughout history, has been possible only with a work force deprived of any viable alternative ("Iron Fist," op cit.).

Today, the state is the greatest enemy of the ethnos. It sends its boys to wars, whether it be for the Zionists or for the capitalists, or both; it taxes their labor, nearly 80% of income in parts of Europe, and has destroyed all who have refused to obey; it has promoted open immigration throughout Europe to dilute the competing loyalty that ethnicity represents to the state; it has decimated the infrastructure of the ethnos through open trade agreements which guarantee that the sources of livelihood are sent abroad.

The idea of the nation-state is a fraud, and is a cynical means whereby the inheritance of the ethnos, however distorted by the bureaucracy, is used to further the aims of the a-national, and frankly anti-national, ruling class.

The Dialectics of Nationalism

The unchecked advancement of social and cultural auto-demolition in western societies has been stated, analyzed and dissected so many times before as it render it hackneyed. This author has consistently made the claim that there is an immediate and direct correlation between the existence of free trade, or more accurately, the globalization of economics, on the one hand, and the existence of multiculturalism and "political correctness," on the other. The drive for a single global market and a worldwide pool of undifferentiated labor has led to all of these

symptoms of cultural violence, which have proven quite profitable for many sectors of the informational and high-technology consumer economy. The anti-cultural nature of consumer-based capitalism, particularly of its virtual, plastic and technological elements is necessary to recreate and revolutionize western society so as to facilitate its insertion inside the new global economic, and therefore political, order. The reality of cultural solidarity, in other words, cannot function at the same time as human impulses are encouraged for the financial benefit of the "infotainment" industries.

This connection between free trade and globalization on the one hand, and multiculturalism in America on the other is important as a theoretical starting point, for it answers questions other theories do not. For example, many theories concerning our cultural decline and the rise of this present American revolutionary regime do not address precisely why it has been led and financed by the wealthiest elite in American society. Other theories do not address the timing of the revolution. There is, for example, an obvious connection between the globalization of economics beginning (in earnest) after World War II and the existence of global economic institutions and mentalities that the specific conditions the end of that war generated.

Furthermore, it might well be more than a coincidence that American culture went into steep decline beginning after World War II and its globalist legacy. One also needs a theory that explains why it happened so quickly, and with so little resistance from the affected parties. Further, one needs to ask how it occurred in a radically concerted fashion, taking in media, entertainment, major corporations, the judicial system and the state itself basically around the same time and with amazingly efficient and total effect. It seems to this author that only this theory -- that of the domestic cultural demands of global capital -- makes sense out of all of these. The negative side of this theory, that is, the diagnostics, is important.

Only rarely in the "patriotic" literature on this topic do serious theories (rather than idiosyncratic conspiracies) receive a fair hearing. Normally, American nationalist literature, unlike the Russian, takes a non-theoretical, issue-by-issue approach to the topic which generally gives rise to far more questions than it answers, and the questions it does answer it treats rather poorly, with little appreciation for the serious methodological issues this sort of thing necessarily involves. Modern nationalism's lack of professionalism is one of the reasons it remains marginalized.

On the other hand, there is the positive side of ethno-nationalist theory, the view that explains the world the counterrevolution seeks to reclaim. The reclamation cannot, however, simply take the world of the middle ages, or of the American founding, or of the 1950s, or the Cossack host, or of nineteenth century Russia, or whichever era one romanticizes and transplant it upon the ruins of global radicalism and revolutionary ideology. History may repeat itself, but the repetition is never identical in every respect to what is being repeated. History has provided western man -- and western nationalists in particular -- with a new and unprecedented set of problems that will lead the nationalist rebellion to adopt proportionally new solutions. This is far from claiming that nationalism requires some static ideology, some shortcut to understanding complex problems, but what is presently necessary is a framework that nationalists can come to share, to provide this set of social understandings, however inarticulate, with a much needed theoretical foundation. Without such a foundation, nationalism and patriotism will remain unable to articulate themselves to the broader American and European public. To an extent, this book seeks to outline a manner of thinking about the counterrevolution.

The notion of counterrevolutionary nationalism, in brief, moves from the well known Hegelian logical scheme of a) abstract unity, to b) its specific content, to c) the full unity, that is, content and unity together in one fully explicated whole, or the final synthesis. Any object can be

considered as, first, a unity. A man can be considered a singular object in space that encases many functions, such as reasoning, breathing, creating, working, reproducing, etc. One thinks of any object as singular, a unity of various different things. Though this does not exhaust the idea of unity. A human can, secondly, be considered as identical to those functions and reducible to them. That is, the content of the above mentioned unity, that which the "unity" is a unity of. Once these are considered, they lead to the mind almost necessarily to the synthetic unity, the final idea of a person (or any object). A human can be considered as a full unity (a synthetic unity), both as a singular entity that is vivified by many internal functions, as a full interrelation of both form and function. In other words, there is unity, that which is unified (the content), and the fully explicated object as an synthesis of these two.

1) Counterrevolutionary nationalism begins with its abstract unity, natural law theory, or the very grounding of collective life. Without it, collective life becomes merely arbitrary, a unity of force and habit, rather than of identity and morality. This, to a great extent, represents the static element in mankind, man's "nature," something not subject to development or relatedness as such. Again, this does not exhaust man as a social creature, nor does it exhaust the notion of natural law. Man as rational and man as communal are irreducible conceptions in coming to define a human being.

This is so because, to deny these ingredients to being human, one must utilize them. Thus, for one to deny that mankind is communal, one must use language, logic and a common frame of reference that all derive from a specific community, or the reality of communal living. On the other hand, to deny that man is rational, one must use rational arguments to make the point.

Either way, a contradiction is reached, and thus, one might conclude with certainty that man is essentially communal and rational, and that these ideas are eternal and natural, not subject to modification at their root. The notion of man as rational and man as communal -- no doubt highly related notions -- contain substantive ethical precepts that must be followed if humanity is to be human; if humanity is to, therefore, be moral. Natural law theory shows that mankind is possessed, of his own nature, of objective ethical truths that cannot be violated without logical contradiction and, necessarily, social destruction.

Natural law, as important as it is, is merely the abstract condition for speaking intelligibly about social ethics; it is an abstract unity, the frame of social life in general. Mankind is a communal animal, which by that idea's very nature, means that all mankind enjoys from society is also natural to him, to paraphrase Burke, that is: education, work, family life, government (the state), moral restraint, aesthetic and intellectual activity, personal leisure, enjoyment and friendship, (among many others) are all things inconceivable outside of human community. None of these things are possible without a common language, frame of reference or a common basic morality and implicit norms of behavior that make up a massive complex of cultural community, or the ethnos. None of these are possible without a force that protects the achievements of one's life from theft or destruction. Without community, mankind cannot exist.

2) From this understanding, one immediately is led, by the nature of the concept itself, to think about its content. Natural law is the abstract ethical unity of our human life. In other words, once one is led to begin considering the nature of our association found in the natural law, that which is mandated by the very concept of "humanity," one immediately passes over into the content of our natural unity, which is -- broadly speaking -- the nation, or alternatively, the cultural community.

Specifically, it is the set of specific ethical norms of community life. Natural law is vague and functions as a foundation for moral judgment. National and communal life are not, but contain specific precepts that are, in order to be just and ethical, reducible to natural law. One

begins to ask, by the very recitation of natural law ethics, of the specific precepts any community might mandate to fulfill our natural human constitution to be rational and communal. What is the nature, in other words, of our association that is so mandated by nature through the idea of a human being? This is to say that a human being, considered per se, has ethical requirements.

Natural law is merely the external unity of human association. The internal unity, that is, the content of the unity (any unity has to be a unity of something), is the cultural unity of the community. What the natural law mandates, the specific needs of human beings as human beings that are met by the formation of societies, are things that develop over time. The specific areas of social life -- government, economics, family life, etc. -- develop their own internal functioning in reference to the people and forces that created it, or, more accurately, that manifested it. In other words, though these institutions are natural to mankind (and thus refer to man's static essence), their specific form and function is a product of social development (and thus refer to man as a dynamic creature that is also definable in relation as well as in himself). This is the central notion of tradition. The means of evaluation -- whether something is done well or poorly within a society -- can only be discerned from the internal functioning of the various practices, occupations and customs that have come to develop in any specific society.

Thus, the notion of the unity of the society is broken down into its most general components. However, both are abstract. This is to say that both, in themselves, are incomplete and provide only a one-sided view of society. Natural law, on the one hand, is too general to develop any notion of determinate moral rules, though it forms the basis for evaluating rules that have developed over time. It is simply an analysis of the concept of human nature so that its objective needs are drawn out; it is strictly a foundation. On the other hand, the rule of custom and social practice, as has been demonstrated by history, without the control of objective moral criteria, can well lead to a static and habitual despotism, and human custom itself can be perverted and used for cynical ends. Custom, community and nationality become arbitrary when removed from objective moral criteria (which, of course, has a Creator outside of itself). Thus, alone, neither natural law nor communal custom are competent to fully explicate our social life, though they are both necessary to it.

3) Thus, the above two moments, natural law and the development of communal consciousness, pass over into their synthesis: internal distributive justice, or the continued interplay between natural law ethics and the development of communal organization, specifically as it affects the lives of individuals and families. Nationalists are rightly criticized by the left for ignoring the internal distribution of rewards within a national organization. Does the notion of communal solidarity suggest a more egalitarian distribution of political power and income? Is nationalism necessarily egalitarian (of sorts), given the central nationalist idea of social cohesion and solidarity? If the answer is no, then the criticism of the left has some validity, viz., that nationalism is a veil the ruling classes throw over their power; it calls itself "revolutionary," but changes nothing concerning the important issues of income and wealth distribution. It is, in short, a method for justifying, through a papering over, of arbitrary power.

It does seem a contradiction to claim the centrality and vital importance of national solidarity on the one hand while accepting radical differentiations in power and prestige, based on wealth (among other things), on the other. In other words, national (and natural) solidarity would seem to necessarily engender self-sacrifice, shared work, communal economic organization and a rejection of the capitalist ethos that rejects any notion of nationality or solidarity whatsoever. Nationalism, as a coherent and interesting theory of social organization, cannot any longer ignore the idea of internal distribution of wealth. It cannot fall into the trap of speaking of external

realities, eg sovereignty or cultural communitarianism, while ignoring internal realities such as the distribution of income, wealth, prestige and social standing.

Thus, distributive justice is the synthesis of natural law and communal organization, and nowhere is this more relevant in a Russia where the overwhelming majority of wealth is concentrated in oligarchic hands or has fled the country altogether. On the one hand, natural law theory claims that all that individuals enjoy as part of the community -- by definition -- become natural to him. They become, in an eccentric manner of speaking, "rights." On the other hand, the communal ethos is never to merely benefit a certain class at the expense of all others. This contradicts the very notion of "communal solidarity." Therefore, the notion of distributive justice must be taken more seriously by nationalist theory, such as it is. The distinction between "leftist" ideas of income distribution and the "rightist" notion of national communal solidarity is the function of culture in the understanding of distribution. Leftists usually maintain the final decision making power of distribution of goods and services in the hand of the state (controlled by the "right" people, of course). It is a formal arrangement of abstract economics, political theory and social policy. On the other hand, nationalist theory seeks distribution of rewards that is based on the very tradition of the society in question. This is done by basing rewards on the notion of socially identifiable and useful practices, occupations, trades and professions.

Nationalism and Economics

Each society naturally develops a division of labor. Everyone cannot be a specialist in everything. Therefore, societies develop means whereby problems are solved by those who are, ideally, best qualified to solve them. Over time, specialists develop, and the concept of a "trade," "profession," "occupation," or "practice" is born. A social division of labor is formalized, and one generation teaches its specific function to the younger. Each practice, whether it be politics, philosophy, religion, plumbing, police work or government service, develops its own internal standards of right and wrong, good or bad, in reference to its own internal functioning and its role in relation to the broader society. One can only judge the merits of a football coach by the standards of the game of football, specifically the role of a coach as it has developed within the context of the game.

One can only judge the merits of a justice of the Supreme Court by the standard of the constitution, case law and the nation's political tradition. It is not possible to judge the merits of a logical argument without reference to logic. In other words, there is no such thing as an abstract judgment. All judgment takes place within a context, and that context is always within the development of the practice in question. Therefore, for any judgment of right or wrong concerning any socially meaningful action, the judgment must be made according to the relevant tradition within the limits already described.

Therefore, it would seem that a rational means of distributing rewards is internally. Simply put, this begins with the uncontroversial notion that those who succeed in teaching should be rewarded far more than an incompetent teacher. Of course, only by reference to the discipline of teaching, i.e. its developing tradition and its relationship to society at large, can a judgment be made as to whether or not a teacher is doing well. Therefore, only a teachers union, or guild, is competent to make such a decision. In this case, rewards are never distributed equally. However, inequality is justified given the objective and well known standards each specific socially relevant function sets for itself, a standard that develops as the field or occupation develops. Michael Walzer calls this "complex equality."

What is important about this notion of distributive justice is that in no way is the distribution of rewards ever separate from the developing tradition of the society. "Marketing"

and "efficiency" are eliminated from the economic vocabulary as goods in themselves, as the traditional practices and guilds within a society control economic life, which, by definition, includes all people involved insofar as they are contributing to the common good. The guild system, or the rule of tradition manifest and materialized in the functioning of various practices within a society, makes the economic a matter of public concern (rather than the private property of the stockholders, advertisers, and venture capitalists) in that it functions for the common good.

However, it still remains a private concern at another level, as the guilds are not a part of the state. Tradition is often found in the development of the various trades and social practices developing in the society, though no doubt there are broader national traditions as well into which the various practices in a society must conform themselves. There is no abstract notion of "justice" here, but distribution is to be dictated by the development of the practice in question and judged by the practice in question. The division of labor into craft guilds seems a necessary institutional manifestation to this arrangement. Such an idea takes the judgment about socially-useful skill away from the uninformed (the uninformed express this through the quantitative measure of "demand") and places it within the guild itself, which is insulated from the popular will (i.e. demand) in respect to its particular standards. In other words, demand (a purely quantitative and abstract measure) is replaced by excellence, by quality.

Distributive justice according to the nationalist and ethno-communitarian idea becomes the synthesis of natural law theory and communal consciousness. For the former, humanity naturally comes together to solve problems that otherwise one individual could never do alone. Therefore, the existence of socially useful crafts and trades come into existence precisely to supply what the meager resources of the individual lacks. This undeniable fact of social life explicitly challenges the myth of the Lockian "state of nature," which inexplicably provides individuals, outside of civilization, the skills to function economically (and in every other way) that derive, in reality, solely from communal cooperation. The state of nature, which is meant to antedate civilization, is impossible without it.

On the other hand, the crafts, their relations to one another, the methods of their work, their common frames of reference, and their relation to the broader society do not speak of an abstract, leftist/socialist notion of labor, but embeds labor into the stream of culture and tradition that created it, as well as being created by it. Labor is not merely a quantitative measure of efficiency, profit, distribution, productivity or some other such lifeless category (categories that both capitalism and communism -- the sister ideologies of modernity -- share), but is necessarily bound up with the functioning of the entire cultural community and are largely constituted by them. In other words, labor is made ethical, made socially real and concrete, rather than conforming to the abstract models of economists of whatever persuasion. Practices are equal inasmuch as they meet the natural needs of the society, though inequality is certainly rational in light of the standards of the specific socially useful craft in question in relation to individual members.

Furthermore, this synthesis is not merely the addition of cultural communitarianism on top of a natural law ethic. It is the full interpenetration of both, i.e. the creation of a new entity out of the ingredients of the old. It is not a radical change of character or essence, nor is it mere addition, but a new entity that keeps the characteristics of the old. This is the Aristotelian idea of justice: human activity being inherently social in itself, both in terms of assisting the function of a society in meeting the natural needs of the community and impossible to meet outside of the community, is also part of the community's life, its sense of itself, and its identity, integrating labor within the culture's continued development. The existence of individuals divided into guilds all for the common good of all combines both equality and inequality. On the one hand, the guilds

are all members of the same community, sharing its life. In this case the guilds are equal; there are none that are more "prestigious" than any other, they are all vital for the functioning of any civilized society. On the other hand, natural inequality is maintained, for within each craft, rewards are distributed according to the standards that have evolved along with the craft itself, making it what it is.

The notion of the guild system is not centrally about the distribution of rewards -- though this is extremely important -- but it is about giving the economy to those that own it, the producers, the skilled labor that makes anything happen, the skilled labor that global plutocrats depend on for their fortunes, and that the armchair, suburban stock-speculator exploits for his (often fleeting) personal profit. The present system gives control over the economy to a handful of speculators, bankers, monopoly capitalists, politicians and (to a lesser extent in light of manipulative advertising) the consumers (in the form of demand). Guilds protect both the public aspect of labor (for it is inherently social) and also protect the private interests of skilled labor and the existence of private property through the ethical merits of the very sociality of the specific craft or field in question. The state, as an abstract entity, is nearly irrelevant, for it acts as an umpire only, occasionally stepping in to settle disputes between the various guilds that come to make up the public life of economic relations within any specific community in the form of compulsory arbitration or some other similar policy provision. The state is the guardian of the national interest over the specific demands of the guild system, though, ideally, the guild organization of labor should already form within an evolving stream of community tradition. It might be the case that the state represents, in some sense, a populist and national idea of a general will that maintains the public presence within the ever-present disputes among individualized enterprises.

The guild system of economic relationships, the control the guilds are to be given in a post-revolutionary society -- that is, a society stripped of its alien elements, a society that has thrown off the shackles of the revolutionary leftist/capitalist/individualist system -- to the skilled workers themselves, organized hierarchically by merit. Within the guild system, both the inherent sociality of labor as well as the ethical and customary content of any specific community is maintained fully in the membership of economic guilds and unions. The transformation of private initiative into public necessity is created by the guild, and made manifest and intelligible in the cultural milieu in which the labor is performed. All of this receives its proper moral formulation in the objective nature of the moral law, and its natural basis in the very structure of the human person, incomprehensible outside of a tradition and community so constituted.

Instead of this, capitalist economics has become the pursuit of efficiency above all else; and efficiency is the highest good of capitalist utilitarianism. Painfully, it has been pursued in callous disregard of humanity as a reasoning organism. Human rationality as a holistic reflection of society and its traditions is at odds with the use of workers as producers solely. Production according to the modern idea of it is the reduction of humanity to the level of a machine, that is, humanity reduced to quantitative figures and "values." Economics is about the exercise of reason and creativity, not the mantra of maximal production at the lowest price and the resultant drive for consumption.

What is equally obvious is that man has an innate (or natural) drive for creation, or, as it were, the application of rationality to raw materials with an eye to aesthetics as well as functionality. It seems that only in recent generations has the aesthetic element been almost entirely dispossessed in favor of functional element; this is merely another invasion of the utilitarian pseudo-ethos upon modern man. The divide between function and aesthetic is a purely modern and utilitarian invention. Aesthetics was man's specific imprint on nature apart from the

remainder of the animal kingdom that has no concept of aesthetic creation (but, some might claim, the animal kingdom does have an inborn sense of efficiency). It is rationality's love for proportion and contrast that forms the natural drive to the aesthetic. Mankind's natural drive to create is never reducible to pure function, but advanced capitalism has forced this separation.

The emphasis on skill and reason that a critical economics draws attention to is an implicit condemnation of most modern visions of production. For the contemporary age, production exists for the sake of efficiency, with exists in turn for the sake of a (predetermined) volume of consumption. The result of this is that retail, advertising and manufacturing outlets must continually spur the drive, or the artificial need, for consumables.

The unfortunate fact about modern economics is that the demand curve does not exist in isolation. In modern postindustrial society, the creation of needs is central to the continuing profitability and expansion of commodity production. The most obvious reflection of this fact is the risky and uncontrolled extension of credit at the retail level. Commodity marketing is presently struggling with the demand for ever-increasing consumption on the one hand, and the unfortunate fact of default and bankruptcy, on the other. At the present moment, the pendulum has swung far to the former side. Such is the most serious contradiction in modern capitalist economics. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is questionable whether or not capitalist production has any incentive to recognize when the consuming public has overextended itself. Any major downturn in the economy will leave the consuming public under a mountain of debt far outstripping their gross worth, and capitalism with many unpaid accounts receivable. In a certain sense, the institutionalization and commodification of middle-class debt may well be capitalism's undoing.

On the one hand, production is based upon efficiency, with the twentieth century idea of "mass production" (which, by definition, includes mass consumption, and both have developed a rather tense relationship) and assembly line production being some of the most violating and dehumanizing inventions of world history. On the other, advertising, necessary to sop up the massive level of production engendered by increases in productive efficiency, almost by its very nature, aims at the consumer as an object, not as a subject. In other words, the object of advertising is not rationality, but passion: fear, envy, hate, lust, greed, anger.

Madison Avenue has been hiding behind that seventeenth century myth of the "rational man" since its inception, knowing full well that man does not live by reason, nor do they live primarily as individuals. That impulse and passion are the primary targets of advertising is beyond dispute, but what is of significance here is that the advertising industry (and by extension, commodity producing and marketing (retail) capital), understands and admits the methods of manipulation while maintaining the myth of individual choice being some sort of utilitarian/rational calculation in the void. This represents another major contradiction in the present system.

Simply put, the development of reason and creativity is merely a means to an end, to the extent it has anything to do with modern economics at all. The assembly line and manipulative advertising are only the distant symptoms of the perversion of economics from the efficacious development of human facilities to the manipulation of passion for the sake of profitable overproduction.

Work is natural to man; man's work is rational given the natural constitution of men as rational creatures. Labor is merely the very practical application of reason; it is reason translated into social utility. This is the nature of labor and its primary principle. Thus, the organization of production must also follow such lines. The medieval guilds differ from modern unions in significant respects, but the most important is that the guilds dealt with labor as essentially a

social and qualitative idea. They worried about the moral worth of their members as well as the organization and ranking of levels of skill and experience. This must be a part of any reformation in the organization of production.

A guild system of production operates according to the principle that work is the rational nature of man manifest in natural objects, that is, his desire to reason about his objective needs and desire to create aesthetically as well as for social utility. Thus, the medieval guild system of production was based around objective measures of skill and ability, with rewards being meted out accordingly. The tradition of the relevant discipline was the measure of poor or exemplary performance; that is, a discipline both useful and aesthetically pleasing is something that developed over centuries and is defined by that development.

Furthermore, the support of the skill itself, in terms of sufficient reward for labor, was the guild's main purpose in the quantitative realm, and they set prices as a result. Consumers paid for high levels of skill, which are objective ideas, not something that changes according to demand, which is purely subjective and, in the age of saturation advertising, ephemeral. Thus, the main distinction between modern unions and medieval guilds was that while the latter accept the modern assumptions about work, the guild system understood it as primarily a socio-rational affair, and its purpose was far more concerned with the quality of labor and skill rather than efficiency pursued in isolation.

The Ethics of the Market

Having to advertise within various ways of life and cultural norms is highly inefficient, for the marketers must "customize" each set of appeals to the consuming public, while manufacturing capital must tailor each product to fit the cultural sensibilities of the individuals involved. Furthermore, cultures and nations exist at differing levels of development, and have their own currencies, markets and social dynamics. It is obvious, then, that efficiency demands the creation of a one world market, a one world language and a one world currency regulated by a one world administrative body. Simply, then, if nations and cultures are to remain in existence and hold a moral authority over its people, then the modes of production themselves must change.

What has become a point of contention within nationalism is the moral status of the "free-market," and the distinctions between the "free-market" and capitalism. Indeed, the two have little in common. The confusion between the two damages the public discourse in economic matters, and allows the captains of industry to steal the mantle of Smith and Locke, a mantle they do not deserve.

The classic description of the free market, the one put forth by Smith specifically, is a series of small capital holders "freely" -- that is, without state interference -- contracting among customers and employees. The holders of capital can not be large enough to dominate others, for that would create a market that was not indeed free, but highly distorted. This is the market's first element.

The concept of competition is the second element, and is the key idea for its semi-moral theory, for the market makes little sense without it. Competition ensures the market's freedom and lack of distortion, in that poor performance by capital, under a game of complete (or at least sufficient) knowledge, leads to its transference to a higher standard, i.e. a new owner. The highest form of capital performance is the standard to which other holders of capital must adopt.

The third element is market equilibrium, where, on the one hand, holders of capital see a return on their capital, and, on the other, consumers are willing to contribute to that overage, that is, to contribute to the return over and above the gross worth of capital. Equilibrium is the stability of capital (supply) and demand in a community, with the community itself, according to

its aggregate demand, setting the standard, or at least, responding positively to the standard that has been set. This theoretical picture, as if it needs to be said, is far from reality.

The status of capital in this current period of advanced economic development bears little resemblance to that envisioned by Locke or Smith (particularly the latter). Not only is the smallholder of capital an endangered species, but the moral standard by which capital was to behave -- part of that taken for granted by classical liberalism and not related to the theory of the "invisible hand" -- no longer exists; that is, that body of tradition that early capitalism took for granted and, unwittingly, undermined. For Smith, capital was not to depart too far from its owners, as small holdings of capital, of course, would not. If it did, it is easy to see how the invisible hand would fail, as layers of bureaucracy create barriers between capital and its target market. Such a situation, apparent today, takes the market and turns it into an oligarchy, an oligarchy "voted" into power by the market itself.

Capital, that is, takes on a life of its own, a life separate from the market it is supposed to serve, and begins to set its own agenda. The free-market is, through centralization and bureaucratization, transformed into the rule of capital, or "capitalism." The argument in brief is that, keeping the moral theory of classical liberalism in mind, the concentration of capital, layers of bureaucracy, the limitation of the unspoken moral barriers intrinsic to classical liberal theory, the power of advertising, and the drive to capture market share all have invalidated the assumptions inherent in the "invisible hand" theory of Smith, and the legitimizing idea behind the "free market."

The perversion of capital has been severalfold: first, capital that has successfully defeated its competition tends to absorb it, that is, capital has an inherent tendency to centralize, limiting competition and market entry. Second, capital, through advertising, has found that it need not appeal to humanity as it is, in its objective state of needing things, but can create and recreate humanity to suit its own ends, that is, the interests capital has created for itself, by itself. Third, the European morality implicit within Locke and Smith, and which created a moral backdrop for the economic actions of citizens, no longer exists. Put simply, concentrated capital has found it easier to appeal to the base drives of consumers rather than their reason, a method ghastly effective because, when manipulating the passions of consumers, there is no intermediary, in that passions demand immediate satisfaction. The result has been the true engine of the modern moral revolution in western societies, namely, the conservative vision of classical liberal economics has been replaced by the suit-and-tie radical using the Sexual Revolution and its appeal to the basest elements of humanity to maintain consumer demand.

What is more, concentrated capital has itself, as James Burnham wrote several decades ago, taken on the appearance of a bureaucratized regime, a sort of mini-state in its own right. As capital leaves the venue of the market and grows to have interests intrinsic to itself, and, further, grows to the point at which an "owner" is an irrelevant term, capital, and the power it can marshal, is effectively run by managers, namely, those who are not susceptible to the "invisible hand," (for, as salaried labor, they have no direct interest in the return of investment capital), while at the same time are not "workers" in the traditional sense, for they produce nothing. These managers, as Burnham and the late Christopher Lasch, in his famous *Revolt of the Elites*, have written, are the new local elite of western societies.

This sort of development is significant to moral theory for several reasons. It is indeed a strong argument for natural law, in that, once an aspect of social organization (in this case, economics) departs from its original course, i.e. serving objective needs, it turns quickly into tyranny, alienation, and absurdity. Secondly, the managerial class has been largely the cause for the elimination of a vocabulary of a "civic virtue" in contemporary political cultures. This is a

factor curiously missing from Michael Sandel's recent work.

As capital departs further away from the community it was originally designed to serve, its interests in it become more synthetic. The only interest that remains is one of abstract profit going to a group of owners (i.e. stockholders) who barely know the nature of the organization. As capital becomes transnational, it loses interest even in the country that gave it birth. Capital becomes alienated from the market, from the nation, and from its original purpose. It becomes a perversion of its former self, and, as a result, the idea of "economics" comes to its fullness, and with it, the "economic man."

This sort of severe alienation brings with it a gradual decrease in the ideas of civic virtue. Within a specific community, small holders of capital are an organic part of it. People and institutions are of the most immediate interests of small concentrations of capital, for its profitability depends on their civic health. The destruction of the community means the destruction of business. Furthermore, the non-quantitative ties small businesses form within a certain community reinforces this interest, and creates a strong backbone for the moral health of a community. Conversely, as capital grows larger, their increasing mobility, need for specialized personnel, and large geographic market force this interest out of the economic picture, leaving profit as an abstract relation to itself. As a result, communities suffer increasing moral and economic decay.

Thus the social motion contained here is the unity of natural law ethics, that which, abstractly, deduces man's nature as both rational and communal (though rationality is never separate from our sociality, but is rather dependent upon it). This, of its very nature, passes over into the content of our social life, the specific ethical precepts, protected by custom and tradition (the only substantially true and ethical notion of consent). The synthesis of these two incomplete concepts is the idea of the union or craft guild as the translator and mediator between the skills of an individual, his own specific contribution to the general welfare and subjective abilities, and that general welfare itself, or the objective cultural community. The guild translates the initiative of skilled labor into the very data of the common good and the social progress of the nation and community. On the one hand, the guild takes the natural law seriously, and provides the skilled laborer with the things that are promised by the existence of any organized human community. These things, of course, by virtue of their naturalness, become the "right" of an individual. On the other hand, labor is never performed in a vacuum, but must be embedded within the cultural milieu of any society, manifesting its specific self-image and ethical self-understanding.

Outside of this, one is left with the dead and quantitative measures of demand, profit (and thus class rule) and efficiency. Within the inculturated guild system, labor takes on its proper character (its character of relation) and provides the society with the very highest in skilled labor for its objective and natural needs as well as providing the notion of social tradition as something intimately related to human life and one's livelihood, bringing it alive, as it were, making the labor itself, in the aggregate, ethical.

This is so because the idea of the common good can never be separated from the cultural and national tradition of a people (or else it would be hopelessly abstract and a dead entity to the population -- the cardinal error of the left), thus, if one is to make labor a truly ethical idea, one both individual and communal, the common good will have to be understood as well, in all of its social and cultural fullness. Only then can labor and economics in general be truly social, rather than its current state of alienation and abstraction, taken out of its social context and made purely quantitative. Marxism and capitalism err in maintaining the abstraction of labor, believing that another abstraction, either the control of labor over industry (the exotera) or the control by state functionaries (esotera) should replace the present abstract condition of labor which is one of

subordination to the unskilled, i.e. speculation and financial power, based solely on quantitative criteria. Nationalist social theory seeks the replacement of alienated labor with the reintegration of the economy within the living tradition of national and community life within the context of natural law.

Globalization as the Sole Issue in Postmodern Politics

Some believe that economics is a social science, having few roots in the humanities. Actually, of course, economics developed out of the humanities through Smith and Ricardo, not to mention Marx, but, as the discipline stands today, it is purely a quantitative affair. Such is economics' most noticeable trait and greatest difficulty. Put simply, economics—outside of its unfortunate treatment in the universities—is tied to the nature of our association: community, ethnos, morality, culture, history and custom. It cannot be, without gross distortion, removed from this.

The stress, to the point of obsession, of the social sciences on quantitative data is a distortion of social life. It is a distortion because no single human being acts in society purely on the basis of a "rational" (as defined by social science) and quantitative analysis. Social life is not amenable, in its fullness, to quantification, to being reduced to a series of measures, numbers or reference points. Human beings, rather, utilize a store of sentiment, emotion, feeling, and much else along with purely disembodied "rational" thought in their daily life. Much of these "emotions," ideally speaking, come in the form of tradition or custom.

It is, however, a sophomoric error to claim that tradition is merely a sentimental attachment, though this is precisely what mainstream social science holds. Tradition, rather, concerns itself with moral and social stability in that the rationality of the ages is crystallized and reduced to the level of the masses for their internalization. In short, the internalization of moral ideas through tradition is the only way a moral life can be led by anyone; both for the sake of communal solidarity as well as the simple fact that an ordinary human being cannot be expected to commit to a rational and logical ethical analysis for each and every moral decision.¹ Certainly, one notes, the academic is little different.

In general, the revolutionary origins of the social sciences is precisely in that contingency is eliminated as either arational, subrational or irrational. Tradition is unquantifiable, although, in an incomplete sense, it is formalizable. A national way of life is not capable of being reduced to numeric representation, though certain specific aspects of it might. A numeric representation is a mere abbreviation of a national and social tradition; it does not exist in itself but is an epiphenomenon of an earlier way of life embodied in individuals.

The social sciences are revolutionary in that they have a revolutionary purpose. The social scientific mentality is that rational is identical with the formal quantification of all aspects of social force, power, authority or decision making. Due to methodological constraints, the social scientific mind can only understand, or communicate, that which is reducible to some quantitative idea, model or formal thesis.

Given our present mode of social life, the above condition certainly makes sense. Highly valued social goods are often of a purely quantitative sort: money, votes, office, market share and much else. Family life, nation and attachment to the ethnos are often dismissed -- at best -- as "sentiment," that is, purely emotional and thus of minimal social value. Alternatively, the "rational choice" school of the social sciences goes further, and reduces such attachments to "cost/benefit" analyses. At worst, such attachments are considered harmful and need to be eradicated. It is certain that a society bent on the purely formal aspects of social life -- and dependent on their continued domination -- has every reason to belittle and despise those forms of

life at odds with it.

It is clear, given the dynamics of the post Cold War political and economic situation that the drive to a purely global market demands the destruction of local social conditions. Where family and ties to the ethnos are strong, happiness is not thereby found in consumption or novel entertainments. The twenty first century is showing that the capitalist class and the social traditionalists are fighting a vehemently fought battle against one another. The demands of consumption are social alienation and family breakdown. Only then can commodity producing capital force the social dependency on itself it needs to maintain increasing levels of profit.

The present sort of social life imposed on the West during the last several generations is precisely what is necessary to mirror the bureaucratic life of the regime itself. That sort of life is marked by a rationalized bureaucratic apparatus, dollars and cents, marginal utility and value, vote counts, party strength and much else purely formal and contentless. As this sort of regime consolidated itself, social life was soon to follow, and institutions and tradition that is not so amenable to formalization has been relegated to, at best, sentiment, and, at worst, oppression.

Economics, specifically, is no different than, and, in fact, might be the very highest expression of, this sort of mindset. Now, of course, some things have changed, and many in the discipline are now questioning the relevance of a purely quantitative approach to human society and decision making as it concerns the day to day life of individuals and social groups. However, the quantitative analysis is still the dominant approach to things social from political science, sociology, psychology, public administration and, especially, economics.

Conclusion

Without the data that folklore provides, that body of tradition that marks the ethnos as unique, man is left as a mere set of individuals, an abstract body of disconnected men held together solely by force and manipulation; this is the very life blood of the state and the continued reason for its unchecked growth.

The reason why ethnicity is absolutely indispensable to any healthy sense of self, or of any healthy social life, is because any other social grouping, from universities to chess clubs, from labor unions to churches, can only function through a continuous appeal to those commonalities that ethnicity provides.

Without the linguistic, traditional and historical bonds that ethnicity is identical with, men cannot even communicate with fellow citizens, as the universe of shared meaning has broken down; debate makes no sense if words are defined according to whatever elites have come to rule him.

As civil society breaks down due to the dissolution of the ethnos, the state, as well as powerful corporate interests, comes to dominate completely, defining the very nature of the civil arrangement. Money and political power become the only goods worth fighting for. This is the reality of the modern west and is the direct result of ethnic connections breaking down in favor of the abstraction of the "nation state", or, even worse, the so-called "free market."

Work, economics and production are social and cultural ideas. In this way are they also qualitative and normative. The application of rationality to the things of nature eventually results in determinate ways of life in terms of wants, aesthetic sensibilities, and the development of skills. Skills and abilities develop naturally from primitive to more advanced forms, with their normative structure also so developing. Such developments also form a major part of the traditional culture of a specific people and are a part of the medievalist guild-centered notion of production, marked by a total interpenetration of culture and work.

Modern economics holds both culture and tradition in contempt. Mass production

understands only efficiency and market share. Traditionalists and nationalists hold that the individual is a composite of individual and social, manifesting all elements of cultural life and irreducible to any specific part of it. Modern economics views the individual as an isolated creature whose happiness lies in the ability to maintain or increase his present consumptive patterns, and the ability to draw from it consistently.

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